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11. Introduction
1.1. Theme
Oceanic life is as diverse as it is a mystery. Understanding of its diversity is continuously
expanding. In spring 2012 over two hundred thousand marine species had been identified1
and yet experts estimate that at the very minimum the real number is five times as high.2 In
addition, and as a cornerstone for all marine life, microbial life constitutes 90 per cent of all
oceanic biomass and is thought to be composed of no fewer than a billion kinds of
microbes.3 Vast areas of the seas remain unexplored. For more than 20 per cent of the
ocean’s volume, even the most comprehensive databases still have no records at all of
marine biodiversity.4 Despite the growing list of known marine life, the oceanic realm faces
loss of diversity and abundance as pollution, climate change, ocean acidification and
extensive fishing take their toll.
Due to technological progress of genomics and bioinformatics in recent years, more
attention has been directed toward the great unknown of the oceans, both from industry and
policymakers. The properties of marine organisms provide the industry with a set of keys to
success. Discovering, researching and developing the unique traits that living organisms
develop as a result of adapting to specific conditions may lead to scientific and commercial
success. Though revenue estimates vary, marine biotechnology is a multi-billion dollar
industry and an industry in growth.5 At the same time, investments in new knowledge and
new commercial applications do not come cheaply. Even such initial steps as collecting
1 Appeltans, et al. World Register of Marine Species [online database], 2011. <www.marinespecies.org>.
2 Ausubel, First Census of Marine Life: Highlights of a Decade of History, 2010, p. 12.
3 Ibid., pp. 12-16.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
5 According to the Marine Board of the European Science Foundation, the global market for marine
biotechnology products and processes is estimated at € 2.8 billion for 2010, see Querellou, et al., Marine
Biotechnology: A New Vision and Strategy for Europe, 2010. See p. 9.
2biological material may cost tens of thousand of dollars each day.6 Chances of successfully
developing a product from an identified compound are slim.7 Consequently, bioprospecting
in the high seas and the great depths are typically conducted by well-funded research
institutions and industry, often in consortia, from developed countries.
Simultaneously, regimes for sharing the benefits which arise from genetic resources from
areas under national jurisdiction are developing, in particular under the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) 8 and its Nagoya Protocol. 9 Stakeholders in developing
countries, largely left out of the marine bioprospecting game, are calling for similar
approaches to the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Regulating who may
bioprospect and who should “bio-prosper” is a question of reconciling different views on
conditions for innovation and global distribution of wealth, while safeguarding the
conservation and sustainable use of the marine biodiversity.
The main international treaty governing the marine areas beyond national jurisdiction is the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).10 It was praised in 1982, at
the final session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, as a
“comprehensive constitution for the oceans which will stand the test of time”.11 For all its
acclaim, UNCLOS was not negotiated with modern biotechnology in mind. The living
resources of the high seas are principally dealt with in Section 2 of Part VII, but the
primary focus is on fishing activities and the conservation of marine mammals. Part XI on
the Area elaborately regulates prospecting for mineral resources, but not for biological
6 See e.g. Hayes, "Charismatic Microfauna: Marine Genetic Resources and the Law of the Sea", 2007, p. 686;
Greiber, Access and Benefit Sharing in Relation to Marine Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction: A Possible Way Foreward, 2011.
7 See Vierros, et al., An Update on Marine Genetic Resources: Scientific Research, Commercial Uses and a
Database on Marine Bioprospecting, 2007, paragraph 4.
8 Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD], United Nations, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79.
9 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity [NP], United Nations, 29 October 2010.
10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], United Nations, 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3.
11 The statement was made the Tommy B. Koh, president of the Third Conference, see United Nations
General Assembly, A Constitution for the Oceans, 1982.
3ones. 12 The rights to the inventions emerging from bioprospecting are governed by
domestic laws subject to a set of international minimum standards and instruments of
harmonisation. However, the laws on intellectual property are minimally concerned with
the origin of the biological material in question.
No instrument of public international law specifically addresses marine bioprospecting in
the high seas. It is therefore of interest to determine the legal grounds13 and conditions
according to which bioprospecting in the high seas can be conducted. Moreover, given that
the issue is currently being discussed among policymakers, it is worth considering
alternatives to the current situation. In light of these issues, the aim of this thesis is two-
fold: it seeks to explore the applicable law and practical legal issues encountered by
bioprospectors in the high seas. Second, it aims to outline regulatory scenarios, with a
specific view of providing concrete alternatives that address the question of access and
benefit-sharing.
In order to answer these questions it is imperative to firstly examine de lege lata relevant
international law. This will be done with a view to establishing the legal framework that
applies to both the activity of bioprospecting and the biological material as an in situ
natural resource. Subsequently, ongoing debates and approaches to bioprospecting
regulation and access within several international fora will be explored. These findings will
be used as a basis for outlining options de lege ferenda for access to biological material in
and from the high seas and the possible sharing of benefits.
As the reader will discover, several legal questions relating to bioprospecting in the high
seas cannot be met with universally accepted answers. The many possible answers also
leave room for creativity for those seeking alternatives to the current situation.
12 See UNCLOS, article 133 on the definition of “resources”.
13 Legal grounds in this thesis means the positive law warranting or permitting a given action or sanction.
41.2. Methodology and relevant sources of law
The two research tasks indicated above represent different ways from which the main
question of bioprospecting in the high seas may be addressed. To a certain extent, they
require different methodological approaches. The methods employed when studying on-
going discussions and outlining new policies will be elaborated upon at the start of the
respective chapters.
This thesis follows the methodology of public international law and relies on the sources of
law found in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 14 Several
convention texts are discussed in the following. UNCLOS will receive most attention, as
this is the most comprehensive global treaty governing high seas activities. The Convention
is ratified by 162 states and is deemed to establish the “legal framework within which all
activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out”.15 Attention is also paid to the 1958
High Seas Convention16 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf17 to further shed light
on the law of the sea. Regional agreements are also relevant in that they offer perspectives
and approaches to high seas regulation. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)18 helps clarify bioprospectors’ obligations
in light of both the law of the sea and the current framework for intellectual property rights.
Moreover, conventions such as the CBD, the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture19 and conventions under the Antarctic Treaty System
present other fora in which bioprospecting or access and benefit-sharing are discussed.
14 Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ Statute], United Nations, 26 June 1945, article 38(a)
and (b).
15 United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2011 (A/RES/66/77), preamble,
paragraph 4.
16 Convention on the High Seas [Convention on the High Seas], United Nations, 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS
11.
17 Convention on the Continental Shelf [Convention on the Continental Shelf], United Nations, 29 April 1958,
499 UNTS 311.
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS Agreement], WTO, 15 April
1994.
19 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture [ITPGRFA], Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 3 November 2001, 2400 UNTS 303.
5When establishing the content of treaty provisions, the method employed will be that set
forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties20 Section 3. If an interpretation in
good faith of the ordinary meaning of the terms leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure,
the travaux préparatoires, as reflected in commentary works, and the circumstances of its
conclusion are used to assist interpretation. 21 It should be noted that for the case of
UNCLOS, party submissions during the negotiations are not available in an official
compilation and are generally not considered as endorsed by the parties.22 The UNCLOS
text is authenticated in six different languages, which are all equally authoritative.23 This
thesis relies on the English text.
Though there are many legal questions that arise in relation to bioprospecting in the high
seas, disputes have yet to hit open courts. As a consequence, judicial decisions do not
constitute an important source of law in the discussions. Scholarly teachings and
publications, on the other hand, offer possible indications of international customary law
and expressions of opinion concerning current legal framework and future regulatory
options. Scholarly literature in fields such as biology, economy and political science are
used to supplement discussions.
1.3. Key terminology
In order to examine the legal issues at stake, certain key terms require explanation and
clarification. This section clarifies how key terms are generally understood and how they
are used in this thesis.
1.3.1. Bioprospecting
Biological prospecting, or bioprospecting, is neither defined nor referred to in UNCLOS or
the CBD. This is itself noteworthy, since these conventions determine important rights and
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT], United Nations, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
21 Ibid., article 32.
22 Wegelein, Marine Scientific Research: The Operation and Status of Research Vessels and Other Platforms
in International Law, 2005, p. 2.
23 VCLT, article 33.
6obligations that fall upon states and their nationals who conduct marine or terrestrial
bioprospecting. The treaty texts of greatest relevance to establishing these rights and
obligations offer little guidance on the ordinary meaning of bioprospecting or the context in
which the term appears. It is therefore necessary to examine whether custom or state
practice indicates a common or ordinary meaning of the term.
Domestic legislation of several states refers to biological prospecting. By looking at
definitions given under different domestic laws, Arico and Salpin point to different
understandings of the reach of bioprospecting beyond the actual search on site.24 They
propose a synthesis of several definitions and suggest that bioprospecting may contain
elements such as, firstly, “systematic search, collection, gathering or sampling of biological
resources for purposes of commercial or industrial exploitation”; secondly “screening,
isolation, characterization of commercially useful compounds”; thirdly “testing and trials”;
and lastly “further application and development of the isolated compounds for commercial
purposes, including large-scale collection, development of mass culture techniques, and
conduct of trials for approval for commercial sale”. 25 By contrast to this broadly
encompassing approach, some legislation surveyed sees bioprospecting as only the first of
these four stages. This suggests an absence of widespread consensus among states as to a
definition of bioprospecting. The survey also shows that definitions are quite recent.26
From this, it can be concluded that a common understanding has yet to develop and that
there probably is no clear definition to be found in international customary law.
Understandings of the term also vary with respect to which objective bioprospecting
pursues. The most pressing question here is whether bioprospecting exclusively covers
commercial research, or whether research with a purely taxonomical or other fundamental
scientific objectives can be said to be bioprospecting. The use of the term by various
international organisations allows exploration of this question. For example, in an
24 Arico and Salpin, Bioprospecting of Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed: Scientific, Legal and Policy
Aspects, 2005, p. 15.
25 Ibid.
26 None of the legislation studied by Arico and Salpin dates back further than the year 2000. This does not
preclude the possibility that older definitions are found in other domestic legislations.
7information paper presented by the CBD secretariat bioprospecting is defined as “the
exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources”
and “the process of gathering information from the biosphere on the molecular composition
of genetic resources for the development of new commercial products”.27 This would mean
that biodiversity exploration performed with purely scientific objectives would not
constitute bioprospecting.
A definition proposed by the UN Secretary-General is somewhat wider. He refers to
bioprospecting as a term “generally understood, among researchers, as the search for
biological compounds of actual or potential value to various applications, in particular
commercial applications”.28 It follows from this definition that prospecting is an active
enterprise. Secondly, this activity has a particular objective. This is not necessarily or only
the objective of encountering specific species, but includes finding of compounds that have
at the very least potentially valuable applications. Such a wide perception of which
compounds may be isolated and identified is highly relevant: it is in the very nature of a
search that the object and potential uses be unknown to the bioprospector prior to a first
sampling. Moreover, the scope of application of a compound may evolve with scientific
developments. Lastly, this definition alludes to bioprospecting as a predominantly
commercial enterprise, without excluding the possibility that scientists may conduct
bioprospecting without any prior commercial objective. For these reasons, such a wide
understanding of the term will be held in this thesis.
Sometimes the bioprospecting is referred to as comprising the securing of intellectual
property rights (IPR) to commercial applications.29 As establishing IPR is no necessary
consequence of bioprospecting, this is not how the term will be understood in this thesis.
27 COP5, Progress Report on the Implementation of the Programmes of Work on the Biological Diversity of
Inland Water Ecosystems, Marine and Coastal Biodiveristy and Forest Biodiversity, CBD, 2000
(UNEP/CBD/COP/5/INF/7), paragraph 6.
28 United Nations Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, 2007
(A/62/66), paragraph 105.
29 See e.g. The Research Council of Norway, Possibilites for a Bioprospecting Commitment in Norway 2008-
2020, 2007, p. 7, defining bioprospecting as covering “commercial purpose research and development,
building on use of natural occurring compounds, all the way from first discovery, over patenting,
benchmarking, improvement, development and commercialization.”
8Nevertheless, the relationship between bioprospecting and patent law has to be taken into
account and will be discussed as needed in the following.
Marine bioprospecting can be conducted from either floating or sub-marine vessels or even
from land or immobile installations such as artificial islands. In the context of high seas
bioprospecting, only the first two options are practicable today. Whether the activity takes
place from a floating or a submerged vessel does not in itself affect the legal provisions
applicable to the activity.
Bioprospecting can lead to a vast array of applications and the scientific methods employed
to reach this end can also vary. Here, biotechnology is the field of applied biology of focus.
In the CBD biotechnology means “any technological application that uses biological
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes
for specific use”.30 This is a broad definition. No specific limitation of field of technology
is intended here by the reference to biotechnology.
1.3.2. High seas
The geographical scope of this thesis is the high seas. UNCLOS establishes different
jurisdictional zones for the sea. The zone in which an activity takes place defines the rights
and obligations of parties to UNCLOS. Article 86 provides that the high seas are all parts
of the seas that are beyond internal waters and territorial seas of a coastal state and beyond
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state. Where states have made claim to an exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) in accordance with Part V, i.e. maximum two hundred nautical miles
“from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”,31 the high
seas are the part of the sea beyond this zone.
A second delimitation must also be made downwards, towards the ocean floor. Here, the
high seas must be distinguished from the Area and the continental shelf, where the latter
30 CBD, article 2, paragraph 4.
31 UNCLOS, articles 86 and 57.
9extends beyond the EEZ. The continental shelf is the natural prolongation of the land
territory of a coastal state, extending at a maximum to 200 nautical miles from the
baselines and excluding the deep ocean floor.32 Beyond lies the Area, defined as “the sea-
bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.33 Both
the Area and the continental shelf are governed by legal regimes distinct from that of the
high seas. These are not the main object of this thesis, but they will be discussed with a
view to resolving certain practical issues that may arise for bioprospecting taking place in
waters bordering the high seas and the seabed.
The high seas and the Area are often referred to as areas beyond national jurisdiction
(ABNJ). As a label, the term ABNJ might be somewhat misleading,34 since states may
regulate the activity of natural and legal persons who are nationals of that state, according
to the nationality principle. Though flag state jurisdiction opens up for a range of possible
legal frameworks applicable to bioprospecting depending on domestic legislation, the focus
of the thesis is the international law applicable to the high seas.
1.3.3. Access and benefit-sharing
The terminology of access and benefit-sharing (ABS) comes from the CBD, but is since
also encountered in other settings of international law. The CBD contains references to
ABS, but it is not defined.
One ordinary meaning of the noun “access” is that of having the “means or opportunity to
enter a place”.35 Applied to this setting, the word captures the possibility to physically
retrieve biological material. Furthermore, access can be understood as a “right or
opportunity to use or benefit from something”.36 This underscores that access can mean the
legal possibility to utilise something. The question of access for bioprospecting in the high
32 Ibid., article 76.
33 Ibid., article 1(1)(1).
34 Barnes, "Entitlement to Marine Living Resources", 2010, p. 83.
35 Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010, sub verbo "access".
36 Ibid.
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seas is therefore a question of establishing the legal grounds and conditions for entering the
high seas with a view to use biological resources in bioprospecting.
The noun “benefit” has several different significations, one of which is that of an
“advantage […] gained from something”.37 As such, it is something deemed of positive
value. Sharing a benefit involves some sort of transfer of this from one person or party to
another. The nature of a benefit is neutral; it can be tangible or not, and monetary or not.
An illustration of the multitude of forms that benefits may take can be found in the non-
binding Bonn Guidelines to the CBD.38 Proposed forms of monetary benefits to providing
parties include e.g. access fees, up-front payments, research funding and even co-
ownership of IPR. The variety of non-monetary benefits proposed in the guidelines is even
greater, including the sharing of research results, admittance to ex situ facilities, capacity
building and even social recognition. Given the range of ways benefits can be shared, the
notion of benefit-sharing varies by context. Such a range raises an issue that will be
addressed in this thesis, namely if any of these forms of benefit-sharing are currently
present within the UNCLOS framework, and which could be appropriate to suggest for
alternative models for high seas ABS relating to bioprospecting.
1.3.4. Biological material
“Biological material” is not found in UNCLOS. In this thesis the term means the resource
used in the activity of bioprospecting. It is any biological material, including genetic,
biochemical or any other biotic component of ecosystems.
By discussing biological material, this thesis adopts a wider perception of the object of
search than that encountered in certain other treaty texts. The CBD regulates access to
genetic resources39 (GR), seen as “genetic material of actual or potential value”.40 Genetic
37 Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010, sub verbo "benefit".
38 COP6, Decision VI/24: Part A. Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable
Sharing of the Benefits Arizing out of their Utilization, CBD, 2002, appendix II, articles 1 and 2.
39 CBD, article 15.
40 Ibid., article 2, paragraph 11.
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material is in turn defined as “any material of plant, microbial or other origin containing
functional units of heredity”.41 Genetic material is a subcategory of biological material. The
choice of terminology in the CBD on GR has been met with criticism, as the meaning can
be ambiguous. 42 It has for instance been subject to debate whether GR comprises
biochemical material. Given this uncertainty and the fact that UNCLOS makes no reference
to GR, there seems to be few convincing reasons to transpose this terminology to an
UNCLOS setting.
The definitions used in international discussions on ABS regarding ABNJ are not always
consistent in this matter. Sometimes reference is to GR or genetic material, while reference
at other times is to biological material more broadly construed.43
A wider conception makes it possible to reduce complex problems of delimitation of what
falls within and without the scope of GR.44 Another advantage of adopting a broader
definition is that of obtaining a greater degree of resistance to technological advances
outdating discussions and regulations. More technologically neutral terms will therefore lay
the grounds for discussions that hopefully are more resilient to the tolls of time.
It should be added, however, that the objective of ABS is to provide for a sharing of
benefits that arise out of certain types of activities and use of natural resources. Therefore
the reasoning behind and objectives for ABS are the same independently of whether the
objects are genetic or, more generally, biological resources.
Identifying and studying these resources is generally perceived as holding great potential
for a wide range of applications. According to a study of patent claims relating to marine
41 Ibid., article 2, paragraph 10.
42 See Dutfield, "Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity: Is there a Role for the Patent System?", 2002, p. 901.
See also Schei and Tvedt, "Genetic Resources" in the CBD: The Wording, the Past, the Present and the
Future, 2010, pp. 8-9; Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: An
Analysis, 2011, pp. 21-24.
43 See Schei and Tvedt, "Genetic Resources" in the CBD, 2010, p. 15.
44 One example is the long-standing discussions in a CBD context of whether derivatives were to be
considered as genetic materials or not, see e.g. Young and Tvedt, Balancing Building Blocks of a
Functional ABS System, 2009, p. 24.
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GR the most important fields of application are pharmacology and human health,
agriculture and aquaculture, food and cosmetics, while emerging uses are found in the
fields of ecotoxicology, bioremediation and biofuel production.45
1.4. Scope
The issue of bioprospecting in the high seas touches upon a wide range of legal questions,
only some of which will receive close attention here. This thesis inquires into the law
applicable to and regulatory alternatives for bioprospecting in the high seas. As such, the
regime of the Area and the biological resources of the Area are not the primary objects of
study. However, sedentary species in general are thought to have great potential for
bioprospecting.46 Genetic resources in the Area have also been subjects of a considerable
body of scholarly literature, perhaps more so than those in the high seas.47 In this thesis, the
relationship between resource regulation of the Area and of the high seas will be
examined.48 Yet, it is not the goal here to provide an in-depth analysis of neither the
common heritage regime, nor the law applicable to the biological resources of the Area.
As established, bioprospecting is closely related to the commercialisation of a product and
the securing of exclusive rights. This thesis examines some of the questions regarding the
relationship between the law of the sea and intellectual property law. Yet, no ambition is
held to provide a complete analysis of IPR questions that arise in relation to bioprospecting
and the patenting of living organisms from the sea.
Also, the use of high seas living resources is closely related to environmental law.
Environmental obligations under UNCLOS receive the most attention, with some attention
45 Arrieta, et al., What Lies Underneath: Conserving the Oceans' Genetic Resources, 2010, p. 18320. The
study refers to marine genetic resources in general and does not refer to specific jurisdictional zones. See
also Farrier and Tucker, "Access to Marine Bioresources: Hitching the Conservation Cart to the
Bioprospecting Horse", 2001, p. 215.
46 Arico and Salpin, Bioprospecting of Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed, 2005, p. 30.
47 See e.g. Glowka, "The Deepest of Ironies: Genetic Resources, Marine Scientific Research, and the Area",
1996; Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea, 2007.
48 See below, section 2.2.4.
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also paid to other treaty obligations such as under CBD and the Antarctic Treaty System.
Yet, international environmental law has developed both since the adoption of UNCLOS
and independently of the law of the sea. Many of the general principles of environmental
law have developed through the adoption of soft law instruments or regional agreements.
Principles have emerged from declarations and action plans made inter alia at the 1972
Stockholm Conference on Human Environment49 and the 1992 United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development.50 As Warner highlights, the detailed provisions in these
and similar instruments tend to apply to areas within national jurisdiction.51 For this reason
and their possible non-binding nature,52 these principles are not awarded close attention for
the examination of current law applicable to bioprospecting.
49 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United Nations Conference on
Human Development, 1972 (A/CONF.48/14/Rev1).
50 The Conference resulted in the adoption of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 which dedicates chapter 21
to oceans, see respectively UNCED, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992 (A/CONF.151/26, vol. I, Annex I);
UNCED, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Chapter 17, 1992
(A/CONF.151/26, vol. II).
51 Warner, Protecting the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the International Law
Framework, 2009, p. 67.
52 See Birnie, "Law of the Sea and Ocean Resources: Implications for Marine Scientific Research", 1995,
pp. 229-232.
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2. Current legal framework for bioprospecting in the high seas
The aim of this chapter is to identify the current law applicable to bioprospecting in the
high seas. This is done, first, by adopting an activity-based perspective and asking how the
activity of bioprospecting is regulated under UNCLOS and other sources of law. More
specifically, this is a question of determining the legal basis for lawfully conducting the
activity. It is also a question of examining the applicable conditions that follow from each
legal basis. Second, a resource perspective will be assumed with a view to identifying the
law relating to the natural resources used in bioprospecting and to determine their legal
status.
Admittedly, the law of the sea does not distinguish activity from resource: just as
provisions on fishing cannot be completely separated from the regulation of fish as a
natural resource and vice versa, the law applicable to bioprospecting as an activity must
also be seen in relation to the law applicable to the biological resources used. Yet adopting
these two perspectives separately offers a methodological platform from which the question
can be addressed from different angles. Put together, these two perspectives will form an
answer to the question of the current law applicable to bioprospecting in the high seas.
2.1. Current framework for bioprospecting as an activity
The freedom of the high seas is a fundamental governing principle of international law,
recognised in customary law, 53 the Convention on the High Seas 54 and in UNCLOS.
Part VII of UNCLOS, entitled “High seas”, states that the high seas are “open to all
States”,55 which reflects equality of use as an important trait relative to the principle. The
enjoyment of this freedom is thus not reserved for coastal states or states parties to
UNCLOS. If viewed as a freedom of the high seas, bioprospecting is an activity open to all,
subject to certain conditions laid down in the law of the sea. A central task is therefore to
discuss the relationship between the freedoms of the high seas and bioprospecting.
53 See e.g. The case of the S.S. "Lotus", P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 10, Permanent Court of International Justice, 7
september 1927, p. 25.
54 Convention on the High Seas, article 2.
55 UNCLOS, article 87(1)(a), (e) and (f).
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Article 87 of UNCLOS lists positively several activities that constitute such freedoms,
including “freedom of navigation”, “freedom of fishing” and “freedom of scientific
research”.56 Although bioprospecting is not unequivocally included among the permitted
activities, it may not be concluded without further consideration whether bioprospecting is
covered by any of the listed activities. A first task is therefore to examine the relationship
between the listed free activities and bioprospecting. The list is however non-exhaustive, as
indicated by the use of the terms “inter alia”. If bioprospecting is not covered by the listed
freedoms, this calls for further examination of customary law.
2.1.1. Freedom of the high seas: bioprospecting as navigation and fishing
The freedom of navigation is further treated in article 90, entitled “Right to navigation”. It
awards all states the “right to sail ships flying its flag” in the high seas. An ordinary
understanding of the term “navigation” is that of planning and directing “the course of a
ship […] or other form of transport” or to “sail or travel over a stretch of water”. 57
Similarly, the right to sail would ordinarily refer to a right to “travel by ship on or across a
sea”.58 Hence, the element of marine transport is the central feature of the freedom of
navigation. Other activities carried out during transport in the high seas may be open to all,
but not on the legal basis of the freedom of navigation. Marine bioprospecting requires
navigation as a prerequisite for venturing the area in question. Ships in the high seas are
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state,59 with which the vessel must have a
“genuine link”.60
56 Other freedoms listed in article 87, such as the right of overflight, the right to lay submarine cables and the
right to construct artificial islands will not be further discussed.
57 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2010, sub verbo "navigate".
58 Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010, sub verbo "sail".
59 UNCLOS, article 92(1).
60 Ibid., article 91(1). See also the High Seas Convention, article 5(1). On the question of the a “genuine link”
and international treaties establishing further regulation of the right to navigate, see Churchill and Lowe,
The Law of the Sea, 1999, pp. 257-277.
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Bioprospecting involves navigation, but reaches further by extending to a search for
biological compounds of value for various applications. This search is an activity with a
different objective than that of navigation and transport. This suggests that bioprospecting
cannot be considered a form of navigation. A contextual interpretation could further shed
light on the validity of this interpretation. In an EEZ, all states enjoy the right of
navigation.61 Yet, other activities such as exploring and exploiting the living resources of
the waters in the EEZ are subject to the sovereign rights of the coastal state.62 Marine
scientific research activities are also subject to a coastal state’s consent.63 Bioprospecting,
such as sampling of living resources, would accordingly not be considered as mere
navigation, open to all, in the EEZ. A related argument may also be made with respect to
the territorial sea. Ships cannot carry out marine scientific research in the territorial waters
of another state while enjoying the right of innocent passage, because this activity renders
the passage non-innocent.64 The result would be the same for bioprospecting, irrespective
of whether bioprospecting is labelled as marine scientific research. Though it cannot be
firmly asserted that the term “navigation” necessarily has the same meaning in the high
seas as in other zones, there are no indications in the treaty text to suggest that the term
navigation is to be given a substantially wider interpretation for the high seas than for the
EEZ. Hence, the ordinary meaning of the terms “navigation” and “bioprospecting”,
interpreted in their context, suggests that bioprospecting is not a freedom of the high seas
solely by virtue of the element of navigation therein. Yet, because bioprospecting involves
navigation, the general principles of flag state jurisdiction also apply to vessels performing
bioprospecting.
The next question is whether bioprospecting can be considered to be a form of “fishing”
and thus be open to all states. Fishing is not defined in the Convention, but one possible
61 UNCLOS, article 59(1).
62 Ibid., article 56(1)(a).
63 Ibid., article 246.
64 Ibid., article 40. See Pavliha and Gutiérrez, "Marine Scientific Research and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea", 2010, p. 121.
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understanding could be that of “harvesting fish for commercial uses”.65 Bioprospecting also
involves harvesting living marine material. The scope of the harvested objects is not
identical as bioprospectors harvest a greater range of marine species than merely fish, e.g.
cold-blooded vertebrate animals with gills and fins.66 On the other hand, there are examples
in international law of quite broad definitions of what is considered as fish. For instance,
non-sedentary molluscs and crustaceans are defined as fish in the UN Straddling Fish
Stocks Agreement. 67 It is not customary, however, to speak of “fishing for
microorganisms”. Bacteria in deep waters are collected in a way that is not generally
regarded as “harvesting”.68 It can be concluded that the ordinary meaning of the terms
“fishing” and “bioprospecting” differ.
Yet, the objectives pursued by both activities have certain common denominators. The
greatest is the use of living resources for predominately commercial purposes. High seas
fishing aims at catching large quantities of a given living resource to produce the maximum
yield from those species.69 Generally, the objective is to catch and subsequently sell the
fish for human consumption, animal feed or related products.70 Bioprospecting does not
aim at harvesting large quantities for subsequent sale of the raw material, but at identifying
material with scientifically or commercially interesting properties that will initiate
subsequent process of development. Human or animal consumption is only one of many
possible applications. The nuances of the respective objectives pursued are also apparent
when considering the methods employed. Fishing methods such as pole and line, purse
seine, gill netting, trawling and stunning71 are not excluded as methods of bioprospecting,
65 World Encyclopedia, 2008, sub verbo "fishing". The harvest can also be for leisurely uses, but this is less
practical in the high seas.
66 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2008, sub verbo "fish".
67 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks [Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement], United Nations, 4 August 1995, 2167
UNTS 3, article 1(a).
68 Leary, "Bioprospecting and the Genetic Resources of Hydrothermal Vents on the High Seas: What is the
Existing Legal Position, Where Are We Headed and What Are Our Options?", 2004, p. 150.
69 Scovazzi, "Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All Activities in the Sea?
The Case of Bioprospecting", 2010.
70 See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 281.
71 See World Encyclopedia, 2008, sub verbo "fishing".
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but are certainly less commonplace for sampling activities. Accordingly, apart from general
objectives of harvest for commercial purposes, there are important differences of objectives
and methods concerning these two activities.
The freedom of fishing in the high seas is in UNCLOS article 87 subjected to the
conditions of Section 2 of Part VII, entitled “Conservation and management of the living
resources of the high seas”. The section comprises the articles 116 to 120. Articles 117 to
120, concerning the conservation of living resources in the high seas, apply generally to
high seas activities and are not restricted to fishing. Hence, bioprospecting is subject to
these conditions.72 An overlap of the conditions applicable to the activities could in itself be
an argument for considering bioprospecting as a form of fishing. Article 116 concerns
fishing and stipulates that the right to engage in high seas fishing is subject to the “treaty
obligations” of the states whose nationals engage in fishing. These treaty obligations will
evidently vary from one flag state to another. They may be concluded under the auspices of
a regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO). They may be area-specific regional
agreements or species-specific agreements that address conservation or attempt to prevent
the problem of over-exploitation of high seas fish stocks.73 No such fisheries agreement is
known that addresses the question of bioprospecting. This may suggest that the usually
quite different ecological impact 74 of the two activities call for different regulatory
approaches.
These variations of objective, method and impact support the point of view that the
freedom of fishing cannot be transposed to bioprospecting without straining the concepts
beyond their usual limits.
Though there is no certain answer to the question of whether analogies from fishing may be
used to establish bioprospecting as a high seas freedom, the reasons against doing so appear
72 The material content set forth in these provisions will be further discussed below, see section 2.2.2.
73 On some of these agreements, see Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, pp. 296-323.
74 See below, section 2.2.2.
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to be the most compelling. It remains to consider whether bioprospecting has more in
common with scientific research.
2.1.2. Freedom of the high seas: scientific research
Whether bioprospecting is scientific research depends on the definitions retained of both
bioprospecting and scientific research. This section explores these concepts and their
possible overlap. It also elaborates on the practical legal implications of considering
bioprospecting as marine scientific research.
2.1.2.1. Scientific research, marine scientific research and bioprospecting
“Scientific research” is not defined in UNCLOS. This is also the case for a closely related
term, namely marine scientific research (MSR). 75 An ordinary understanding of the
research is that of a “systematic investigation into and study of materials and sources in
order to establish facts and reach new conclusions”.76 Moreover, a research could be said to
be scientific when “based on or characterized by methods and principles of science”.77
Although the Convention scarcely refers to “scientific research”78 without the adjective
“marine”, MSR is quite extensively regulated, notably in Part XIII entitled “Marine
Scientific Research”. A possible explanation for this is that different committees negotiated
parts VI and XIII of the Convention.79 It is not specified in the Convention whether or not
these two concepts are to be considered as synonymous.
First of all, a purely lexical interpretation indicates that scientific research is a broader and
more general term than MSR. Studies of the atmosphere, for example, that are undertaken
75 On yet a related term, “hydrographic survey”, see UNCLOS, article 21(1)(g) and Wegelein, Marine
Scientific Research, 2005, pp. 80-82.
76 Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010, sub verbo "research".
77 Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010, sub verbo "scientific".
78 Apart from article 87, “scientific research” is only referred to six times in the convention text and always in
relation to scientific research installations or equipment, scientific research programmes or scientific
research policies, see articles 123, 200, 249 258, 260 and 261.
79 Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary. Articles 192 to 278,
1991, p. 432.
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from a research vessel in the high seas could be considered to be scientific research and
accordingly a high seas freedom, without necessarily being classified as MSR, since the
marine environment is not the object of the research.80 This suggests that the two concepts
indeed have different meanings. On the other hand, the enjoyment of the freedom of
scientific research as set forth in article 87 is “subject to Parts VI and XIII” which
underscores a close relationship between scientific research and MSR.81 Part VI on the
continental shelf awards coastal states the sovereign rights to the natural resources of the
continental shelf82 and limits the extent to which scientific research can be done on the
continental shelf.83 More important in this context is the reference to Part XIII: if the
scientific research is considered “marine”, the legal regime set forth in Part XIII applies.
Scientific research can generally be regarded as “marine” when directly concerned with the
marine environment.84 Regarding marine bioprospecting, the activity is directly concerned
with biological material in the marine environment. Accordingly, if bioprospecting were
considered scientific research it follows that bioprospecting would also constitute MSR. It
is therefore the definition of MSR that will be sought in the following.
As the term is generally understood, MSR opens up research in a wide range of disciplines,
such as biology, biotechnology, geology, chemistry, physics, geophysics, hydrography and
oceanography.85 It includes research conducted with a variety of research objectives. As
noted by Churchill and Lowe, scientific knowledge is a precondition for rational
exploitation of oceanic resources and for safer navigation.86 MSR also provides humanity
with a greater understanding of the Earth, and has historically prompted the understanding
that the planets’ outer layer consists of moving plates.87 The question is whether MSR also
includes bioprospecting, i.e. the search for biological compounds of value to various
80 See Andenæs, Norsk havforskningsjurisdiksjon, 2009, pp. 28-30.
81 UNCLOS, article 87(1)(f).
82 Ibid., article 77(1).
83 See below, section 2.2.3.
84 Wegelein, Marine Scientific Research, 2005, p. 78.
85 Pavliha and Gutiérrez, "Marine Scientific Research and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea", 2010, p. 115.
86 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 400.
87 Ibid.
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applications, in particular commercial applications. This requires a further examination of
the legislative history of MSR.
A strong contributing factor to the lack of definition of MSR in the Convention was the
disagreement among parties as to the necessity of a distinction between fundamental, pure
or basic scientific research, on the one side, and commercially oriented or applied research
on the other.88 This disagreement persists today among parties to UNCLOS. 89 Marine
scientific research was not included in the non-exhaustive list of freedoms in the 1958
Convention on the High Seas, but has been considered as such in virtue of customary law
for several decades prior to the adoption of UNCLOS.90 In the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf, a distinction between pure and applied scientific research was
introduced relating to research on the continental shelf: a coastal state should not normally
withhold consent for research conducted with “a view to pure scientific research into the
physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf”.91
The question of a possible distinction between fundamental and applied sciences arose
again leading up to and during the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. Whereas the
Convention on the Continental Shelf regulated the relationship between the sovereign
rights to the resources of the coastal state and the rights of third parties to MSR on the
continental shelf, the task at hand had now grown in complexity. The perceptions of MSR
were greatly affected by the expansion of coastal state jurisdiction, the growing awareness
of the value of marine science and the emergence of new notions such as the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction as the “common heritage of mankind”.92 In 1972, a proposal
submitted by Canada to Sub-Committee III of the Sea-Bed Committee cast MSR as “any
study, whether fundamental or applied, intended to increase the knowledge about the
88 See Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary. Articles 192 to
278, 1991, p. 434-450.
89 Beslier, "The Protection and Sustainable Exploitation of Genetic Resources of the High Seas from the
European Union's Perpective", 2009, p. 339.
90 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 401.
91 Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 5(8).
92 Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary. Articles 192 to 278,
1991, p. 432.
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marine environment, including all its resources and living organisms, and embraces all
related scientific activity”. 93 This constitutes a broad definition, but still requires a
scientific intent. Four Eastern European states made a somewhat similar proposal the
following year: scientific research “in the world ocean” would be
any fundamental or applied research and related experimental work […] which does not aim
directly at industrial exploitation but is designed to obtain knowledge of all aspects of the
natural processes and phenomena occurring in ocean space, on the sea-bed and subsoil thereof
[…].94
Such a proposal, read with modern MSR in mind, would appear to include commercially
oriented research insofar as industrial exploitation is not the primary aim of the research.
Critics argued that a line should be drawn between industrial research, offering immediate
possibilities for utilisation for economic purposes, and basic scientific research, carried out
for the benefit of the community “without concern for profit” and yielding “data which
were accessible to all, were not of a secret nature, and were public property”.95 On the basis
of these and other proposals, a working group formulated MSR as “any systematic
investigation, excluding industrial exploration and other activities aimed at the direct
exploitation of marine resources, designed to increase mankind’s scientific knowledge of
the marine environment”.96 While several states were prepared to accept this definition
provided that MSR was recognised as a basis for industrial and commercial advantage,
other parties argued that a definition was superfluous, as the meaning of the terms would
indirectly be established in the substantive articles.97 In light of the current disagreement on
MSR, the argument against not providing a definition is not very convincing. In 1975, draft
proposals submitted would again support the effort to defining MSR broadly, while
introducing a distinction of pure and applied research only in relation to MSR conducted on
the continental shelf and in the EEZ.98 Later, even the broad definitions were dropped. The
difficulties parties to UNCLOS had in agreeing upon a definition illustrate that the
93 Ibid., p. 441.
94 Ibid. The term “world oceans” was phrased as to exclude the continental shelf.
95 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (Office of Legal Affairs), Marine
Scientific Research: A Revised Guide to the Implementation of the Relevant Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2010, p. 5.
96 Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary. Articles 192 to 278,
1991, p. 442.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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understanding of the term may vary both according to the perceptions of the different states
and according to jurisdictional zones.
From this look at the legislative history, two main positions can be discerned. The first is
that MSR includes commercially oriented research such as bioprospecting. The second is
that research for commercial purposes is resource-exploitation and not MSR. Conclusive
views on whether bioprospecting is a mere sub-category to MSR or whether it is a distinct
activity are premature in the current situation. Yet, there are compelling arguments for both
positions.
A convincing argument to support the position that commercially oriented research in the
high seas is indeed MSR is the wording chosen in article 87 and Part XIII. States did not
expressly submit to MSR in the high seas as excluding commercially oriented research.
This argument goes both ways, though, as states did not either expressly consent to an
inclusion of commercially oriented research as MSR. Yet the important point to make here
is that a distinction between fundamental and applied research was proposed and rejected.
The only explicit regulation of purpose for MSR applicable to the high seas is that it shall
be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes.99 In the absence of a codified distinction
between pure and applied sciences for MSR in the high seas, it is the ordinary meaning of
the term MSR that parties have to fall back on. As seen above, MSR can be said to be a
systematic investigation related to the marine environment based on methods and principles
of science. Bioprospecting indubitably contains elements of scientific research, such as
systematic search, collection, gathering or sampling of marine resources based on methods
of science. The composition of persons and the equipment used may also be the same for
the two activities, e.g. in taxonomical studies and bioprospecting cruises. Furthermore, it
may be argued that a commercial objective for the expedition does not eliminate a
simultaneous objective of increasing human knowledge of the oceans.
99 UNCLOS, article 240(a).
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The position that MSR excludes commercially-oriented bioprospecting finds support
through a contextual interpretation. Though the Convention does not employ terms such as
fundamental or applied research for MSR, such a distinction is de facto introduced with
respect to EEZ and on the continental shelf.100 Here, states have the discretion to withhold
consent to third party MSR, where the project is of “direct significance for the exploration
and exploitation” of their natural resources.101 These are projects that may be reasonably
expected to produce results enabling resources to be located and assessed with respect to
their availability for commercial exploitation.102 If however, these projects are carried out
“in order to increase scientific knowledge on the marine environment for the benefit of all
mankind” consent must normally be granted. 103 Similarly, the regime of the Area
distinguishes between MSR, which all states may undertake for the benefit of mankind,104
and other activities such as “prospecting”105 or “exploration and exploitation”106 which are
subject to the control of the International Seabed Authority, which acts on behalf of
mankind. The fact that this distinction was introduced for other zones, could suggest that
MSR also excludes commercially oriented scientific research in the high seas.
Considerations on the effective implementation of the objectives of MSR, i.e. the
promotion of the “study of the marine environment”, 107 could call for a similar
understanding of the term in all jurisdictional zones, including the high seas.
For the case that MSR in the high seas is to exclude commercially oriented research, a line
must be drawn between purely scientific and commercial research. For bioprospecting,
there would have to be a parameter for establishing when a cruise is conducted for purely
scientific purposes and when it crosses the “line of commercialisation” and becomes
100 See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 405.
101 UNCLOS, article 246(5)(a). See Wolfrum and Matz, "The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity", 2000, p. 458, who argue that states may
withhold consent to bioprospecting in the EEZ.
102 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (Office of Legal Affairs), Marine
Scientific Research: A Revised Guide, 2010, p. 10.
103 UNCLOS, article 246(3).
104 Ibid., e.g. articles 256 and 143.
105 Ibid., article 16(2)(f)(ii) and Annex III, article 2.
106 Ibid., e.g. articles 1(1)(3), 137 and 153.
107 Ibid., preamble, paragraph 5.
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something else. Of some indication here could be a statement made by the UN Secretary-
General:
In most cases, genetic resources are collected and analyzed as part of scientific research
projects, in the context of partnerships between scientific institutions and industry. It is only at
a later stage that knowledge, information and useful materials extracted from such resources
enter a commercial stage. The difference between scientific research and bioprospecting
therefore seems to lie in the use of knowledge and results of such activities, rather than the
practical nature of the activities themselves.108
According to this view the line can be drawn after the end of a cruise. Yet, if the concern is
to establish the rights and obligations of bioprospectors while at sea, the distinction must be
drawn at an earlier stage. Generally, attempts at such earlier distinction are drawn the on
the basis of the intent of researchers.109 Applying a characteristic such as intent that is
typical of natural persons onto legal persons can be problematic.110 In this context, it would
mean establishing the presence of commercial intent of a consortium or an institution,
though different teams or individuals within the larger cruise staff or administration may
have different intents and objectives for the cruise. Where there is a difference of intent, it
would be necessary to determine which intent is to prevail. Furthermore, if intent should
determine conditions for access, it would have to be presupposed that such intent exists
prior to conducting the activity and does not evolve afterwards, which may not be the case.
This would exclude fundamental research activities that only later result in the
identification of commercial application and serendipitous encounters of commercially
interesting biological features. Clearly establishing a commercial or non-commercial intent
is not an easy task. Despite criticism, a distinction based on intent has gained some
traction.111
108 United Nations Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, 2005
(A/60/63/Add.1), paragraph 202.
109 See e.g. Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Study on the Relationship between the Convention on Biological
Diversity and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Regard to the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Genetic Resources on the Deep Seabed, Convention on Biological Diversity, 2003
(UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/8/INF/3/Rev.1), paragraph 47.
110 Wegelein, Marine Scientific Research, 2005, p. 83, who argues that the problems of establishing intent
should result in interpreting MSR as comprising both pure and commercial research. See also Hayes,
"Charismatic Microfauna", 2007, p. 692.
111 Broggiato, "Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction – Coordination and Harmonisation of
Governance Regimes", 2011, p. 37.
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For the case that bioprospecting is a sub-category of MSR, the question is what conditions
apply to the conduct of this activity. UNCLOS establishes general principles for conduct of
MSR. A first principle is that MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes.112
This is in accordance with the general rule applicable to all activities in the high seas found
in article 88. Also, MSR shall not unjustifiably interfere “with other legitimate uses of the
sea”.113 Concerning ABNJ, this principle bears on the equal access of all states to the high
seas. A further general principle states that MSR shall be conducted in “compliance with all
relevant regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention including those for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment”.114 This principle can in turn be
seen in relation to the last principle, namely that MSR shall be conducted “with appropriate
scientific methods and means” compatible with UNCLOS. 115 This refers to standards
within the scientific community. A regional and noteworthy approach to these standards is
offered by the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic (OSPAR).116 A code of conduct for marine research is applicable to the parts of
the OSPAR area that are outside national jurisdiction. Researching vessels sailing the flag
of a party to OSPAR should, when working in areas of particular ecological vulnerability,
take “utmost care […] not to disturb or damage the features as far as possible”.117 Only the
most environmentally friendly methods should be used: sampling tools should match site-
characteristic features and be minimally intrusive in the sensitive or protected areas and
underwater noise should be restricted to a minimum”.118 The guidelines go on to state that
researchers should “ensure that transport of biota between different marine regions that
could lead to changes in the marine environment […] does not occur”119 and that the
number of samples should be “reduced to the necessary minimum”.120 The guidelines are
112 UNCLOS, article 240(a). For a discussion of MSR for military purposes, see Wegelein, Marine Scientific
Research, 2005, pp. 94-99.
113 UNCLOS, article 240(c).
114 Ibid., article 240(d).
115 Ibid., article 240(b).
116 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic [OSPAR], 22
September 1992, 2354 UNTS 67.
117 OSPAR, OSPAR Code of Conduct for Responsible Marine Research in the Deep Seas and High Seas of
the OSPAR Maritime Area, 2008 (Agreement 2008-01), paragraph 14.
118 Ibid., paragraph 19(a) and (c).
119 Ibid., paragraph 20.
120 Ibid., paragraph 21.
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of a non-binding nature, and OSPAR Convention itself is only binding upon parties, but
this still provides an example of what certain states consider appropriate scientific methods.
In addition to the four general principles for MSR, UNCLOS establishes concrete rights
and duties. Analysing the relationship between these rights and duties and bioprospecting is
the task set forth for the next three sections. For the case that bioprospecting is a form of
MSR, the question is one of determining which conditions apply to bioprospecting. It is
important to note that the consequences discussed below may in themselves constitute
arguments for or against considering bioprospecting as a form of MSR.
2.1.2.2. Bioprospecting as MSR: patenting bio-inventions
Where bioprospecting leads to a new commercial application, exclusive intellectual
property rights are often established in order to protect the invention. UNCLOS is not
generally seen as an instrument of IPR. Securing such rights happen not at sea but rather on
the land territory of one or several states. The practical question that arises is if and how the
rights and obligations under UNCLOS influence the possibility of seeking exclusive rights
to biotech inventions under other legal instruments. For the sake of a meaningful
discussion, a brief survey of the intellectual property law applicable to inventions from
bioprospecting is now necessary.
Patents are the form of IPR relevant to bioprospecting.121 The general rationale behind
awarding patents is one of providing an incentive to innovate and thus a benefit to
society.122 The granting of patent protection is an act performed by national authorities
according to domestic and regional laws. 123 Where the application is filed or granted
determines the applicable jurisdiction. However, at a global level, the WTO TRIPS
Agreement sets minimum requirements for domestic legislations. These minimum
121 Other forms of intellectual property rights such as copyrights, trademarks or industrial designs will not be
discussed in the following.
122 See e.g. Westerlund, Biotech Patents: Equivalency and Exclusions under European and US Patent Law,
2001, pp.12-18.
123 See e.g. European Patent Convention [EPC], 5 October 1973.
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requirements involve no specific regulation of material from ABNJ. Patent law is not
concerned with the provenance of the biological material used to develop the invention.124
A patent provides the holder, the patentee, with an exclusive right to an invention for a
limited period in time. Where bioprospecting has led to the invention of a product, the
patentee may exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing
for these purposes the product.125 Where the invention is a process, the patentee may
prevent others from using, offering for sale, selling, or “importing for these purposes at
least the product obtained directly by that process”.126 The Agreement requires members to
make patents available for “products and processes, in all fields of technology” meeting
three basic requirements. The invention must be deemed new, involve an inventive step and
be capable of industrial application.127 The overarching rule in patent law provides that
inventions and not discoveries are eligible to patenting. The line between these concepts
can be hard to draw concerning biotechnological inventions. There is no universal
definition of what is considered an invention, but it can be considered as a new product or
process with no previous existence.128 Yet many substances that are isolated from naturally
occurring substances found in nature are being patented, often without substantial
changes.129 Such isolated or purified subject matter must generally speaking meet two
requirements to qualify as inventions: it must not exist freely per se in nature and its
function must be determined.130 There is a great deal of controversy surrounding the debate
patentability of naturally occurring substances, which need not be addressed here.131
124 Tvedt, "Patent Law and Bioprospecting in Antarctica", 2010, p. 49. See TRIPS Agreement, article 27(1).
125 TRIPS Agreement, article 28(1)(a).
126 Ibid., article 28(1)(b).
127 Ibid., article 27(1).
128 Westerlund, Biotech Patents, 2001, p. 32.
129 Ibid., p. 57.
130 Ibid., p. 59.
131 For a review of current legal solutions to this, see Temmerman, Intellectual Property and Biodiversity:
Rights to Animal Genetic Resources, 2012, pp. 48-68.
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The Agreement leaves member states a narrow margin of appreciation for making
exemptions to patentability.132 Exception can be made for “plants and animals other than
micro-organisms” and “essentially biological processes for the production plants and
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes”. 133 Accordingly,
microorganisms must be patentable provided they meet the basic requirements. Dutfield
argues that this must also be the case for genetic and biochemical resources, since they are
not expressly excluded.134 This will also depend on an interpretation of the terms “plants
and animals”.
By obtaining these rights, bioprospectors may recover costs of R&D through monopoly
pricing, licence fees and royalty payments,135 and potentially gain substantial revenues.
Having set out these fundamentals of patenting and inventions involving high seas
biological material, it is now time to examine the relationship of these rules and UNCLOS
provisions relating to MSR.
2.1.2.3. Bioprospecting as MSR: publication of research results and patents
Publication of research results is a deeply rooted scientific tradition and is reflected in
UNCLOS article 244 as an obligation to publish and disseminate information and
knowledge that results from MSR. There are three reasons to examine the obligation to
share research results in the context of the current inquiry: firstly, clarifying the obligation
would offer a partial answer to the question of which obligations fall upon bioprospecting
if considered a form of MSR. Secondly, this obligation may provide arguments for or
against considering bioprospecting as a form of MSR. Lastly, the sharing of knowledge
132 TRIPS Agreement, article 27(2)(3). The provision allows for exemptions to be made if this is necessary to
protect ordre public and morality. On the very narrow field of application of these criteria, see Grubb,
Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology: Fundamentals of Global Law, Practice and
Strategy, 1999, pp. 256-258.
133 TRIPS Agreement, article 27(3)(b). This provision also opens for protection of plant varieties either by
patents or through an effective sui generis system or a combination of these two options. This issue will
not be treated here.
134 Dutfield, "Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity", 2002, p. 903.
135 Salpin and Germani, "Patenting of Research Results Related to Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction: The Crossroads of the Law of the Sea and Intellectual Property Law", 2007, p. 18.
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may constitute a form of benefit-sharing.136 If this obligation falls upon the activity of
bioprospecting, it should operate as a foundation for later discussions on regulatory options
for ABS in the high seas.
A first task is to establish what UNCLOS requires to be published and how publication
must occur. According to article 244, states and competent international organisations shall
make available “by publication and dissemination through appropriate channels
information on proposed major programmes, their objectives as well as knowledge
resulting from marine scientific research”.137 To this end, states shall “actively promote the
flow of scientific data and information”, both alone and in co-operation with other states
and international organisations.138 As a general limitation applicable to all activities under
UNCLOS, states are not required to disclose information which is “contrary to the essential
interests” of the state.139
“Knowledge resulting from marine scientific research” indicates that conclusions and
findings that are a consequence of the MSR activity are what is to be shared. In
bioprospecting the title to research results is likely to be regulated by contracts or
understandings among the participants and funding parties. Where universities participate,
it must also be added to the equation the increasing tendency of western universities to seek
patent protection and become technology owners. 140 University intellectual property
policies may regulate and limit the freedom to disseminate results.141 Industry contracts
may also stipulate terms for the publication of results or even exclude it altogether.142 The
duty to make the information available articulated in article 244 is placed upon states and
competent international organisations, whereas nationals are not specifically mentioned.
136 See e.g. Matz-Lück, "The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind", 2010, p. 70.
137 UNCLOS, article 244(1). [emphasis added]
138 Ibid., article 244(2). The clause also provides for the transfer of technology resulting from MSR.
Technology transfer will be discussed below, see section 2.1.2.3.
139 Ibid., article 302.
140 De Larena, "The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?", 2007.
141 Gorina-Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific Research, 2003, pp. 387-396.
142 Salpin and Germani, "Patenting of Research Results Related to Genetic Resources from Areas beyond
National Jurisdiction", 2007, p. 22. See also Gorina-Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific
Research, 2003, pp. 396-399.
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This may have the practical implication that only where states hold title to the research
results would there be an obligation to make the knowledge public. 143 If research is
conducted by private entities and national legislation does not provide for similar
dissemination obligations falling upon private subjects, the result would be that only parts
of the total marine research would be made public. This seems to run counter to the
objective of the provision, namely the general dissemination of MSR research. Another
possible interpretation is that article 244 obliges or at the very least encourages states to
“actively promote” the dissemination of knowledge from MSR irrespective of whether it is
the state itself or its nationals that hold the title to the research results.
Article 244 sets forth an obligation to make MSR knowledge “available by publication and
dissemination”. An ordinary understanding of these terms may suggest that an active effort
of publication is required. Merely answering questions as to research results if another state
were to ask could appear insufficient. “Appropriate channels” may suggest publication in
scientific journals, making the results public online or, as Salpin and Germani suggest,
through diplomatic channels.144 If this latter mode of publication is seen as sufficient, it
could in turn indicate that publication upon demand from another state could satisfy the
requirements of article 244. Common modes of publishing research results are through
regional scientific communities, such as the International Council for the Exploration of
Sea, 145 or global entities, such as the World Meteorological Organization, the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and the International Hydrographic
Organization.146
A separate yet related question arises where bioprospecting has led to a patented invention.
The patent system balances the exclusivity obtained by a patent claim with publication.
143 Salpin and Germarni argue that the obligation to publish is more likely to be complied with where the
research is publicly funded, see Salpin and Germani, "Patenting of Research Results Related to Genetic
Resources from Areas beyond National Jurisdiction", 2007, p. 22.
144 Ibid., p. 23.
145 See Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea [ICES Convention], 12
September 1964.
146 Andenæs, Norsk havforskningsjurisdiksjon, 2009, pp. 45-46.
32
This is often referred to as the quid pro quo of patent law.147 Previous publication bars
further patentability in identical form. Publication in patent law takes the form of a
disclosure of the invention. 148 The justification for requiring patentees to disclose the
invention can be explained by the blocking effect on other inventions: it notifies third
parties of the invention and its scope, and explains the application of the invention.149 The
TRIPS Agreement article 29(1) requires that parties make applicants disclose inventions
“in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person
skilled in the art”.150 Generally in patent law, these descriptions are written descriptions. A
question that can be raised is whether written disclosures on inventions from
bioprospecting in the high seas satisfy the requirements of UNCLOS article 244 of making
the knowledge available through appropriate channels. A complete answer to this question
requires an empirical analysis of such disclosures, a task that goes beyond the scope of this
thesis.
However, considering a few general features patent disclosure is informative. Firstly, the
inventions are publicly disclosed and are likely to contain descriptions at a very high
technical level and sometimes formulated by patent lawyers. The UNCLOS requirement is
not detailed with regards to how the research must be presented. Probably, one may not
read into article 244 a pedagogical requirement of this information being comprehensible to
anyone but the persons skilled in the art. Secondly, the general disclosure is likely to omit
references as to where the biological material originated, unless domestic regulation
requires this. This is the controversial question of disclosure of origin, which has arisen as a
result of CBD obligations. Schematically, it opposes the views of developing and
developed states. 151 Though certain domestic intellectual property statutes require a
147 Tvedt, "Patent Law and Bioprospecting in Antarctica", 2010, p. 51.
148 The issue of disclosure of an invention must not be mistaken for the controversial question of disclosure of
origin of biological material or traditional knowledge. These are separate concepts, which bear similar
denominations.
149 See Westerlund, Biotech Patents, 2001, pp. 77-79.
150 See similarly EPC, article 83. The somewhat different requirement in the United States is of a description
of an invention to be in such full, clear, and exact terms as to enable any skilled person in the art to make
and use the invention, see Westerlund, Biotech Patents, 2001, p. 81.
151 See e.g. Directive on The Legal Protection of Biotchnological Inventions [Directive 98/44/EC], The
European Parliament and the Council, 6 July 1998, 1998/44/EC and its quite loosely formulated article 27.
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disclosure of origin, the support is far from universal and no proposals to amend the TRIPS
Agreement have so far been successful.152 Currently, then, a written disclosure need not
state that the biological material is collected in the high seas.
In relation to article 244, such an omission is of less importance since the provision applies
generally to all zones of jurisdiction and does not require parties to specify the zone in
which MSR was undertaken. A separate question is whether article 244 requires the
publication of results to indicate to the reader that the knowledge is a result of MSR. On the
one hand, according to a straightforward textual interpretation of the UNCLOS requirement
to make MSR knowledge “available”, there is no obligation to state that the research results
from MSR, so long as the results are published. On the other hand, since an important
objective is to the promote MSR there may be an obligation to disclose that the patent
results from MSR. After all, states do have the general obligations to “promote and
facilitate the development and conduct of marine scientific research”153 and to “integrate
the efforts of scientists in studying […] the marine environment”.154 Such responsibilities
could speak to there being an obligation to indicate that the knowledge results from MSR.
The answer to this question should probably also depend on how scientists assess the added
value of knowing that the information results from MSR.
Concerning marine bioprospecting, written disclosures are not the sole relevant form of
disclosure. Several states have accepted the deposit of microorganisms as a supplement or
replacement to the written description. Such deposit is regulated, inter alia, by the
Budapest Treaty on International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the
Purposes of Patent Procedure. 155 This treaty seeks to overcome the difficulty of
“repeatability” of microorganisms in patent procedures and the viability of culture
152 See Straus, "How to Break the Deadlock Preventing a Fair and Rational Use of Biodiversity", 2008.
153 UNCLOS, article 239.
154 Ibid., article 243.
155 Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganism for the Purposes of
Patent Procedure [Budapest Treaty], WIPO, 28 April 1977. As of May 2012 there are 75 contracting
parties.
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collections.156 Access to the deposit for third parties is not regulated in the treaty, but the
treaty regulations specify that a principle of secrecy to information on deposited organism
applies, stating that no depository authority shall give “information to anyone whether a
microorganism has been deposited”, nor shall it give “information to anyone concerning
any microorganism”.157 The Budapest Treaty does not prevent patentees from deciding to
make descriptions of inventions available to others, but they have no such obligation. The
disclosure of an invention is therefore more limited under the Budapest Treaty than under
the general patent law, as third party access to the disclosure may be replaced with deposits
that third parties may not have access to. Subsequently, it can be concluded that the rule
under the Budapest Treaty does not provide for publication and dissemination of MSR
results “through appropriate channels”.158 Though domestic regulations may provide for an
effective implementation of UNCLOS article 244, this task can be rendered difficult as a
result of the principle of secrecy practiced under the Budapest Treaty system.
Provided that contractual obligations or IPR policies do not prevent publishing results from
MSR, there is no time frame set in article 244 for the publishing or dissemination of
research results. Awaiting the approval of a patent application before publishing seems
therefore not to pose problems.159
To sum up, contractual obligations and patents may prevent swift publication of research
on marine biological material. Depending on case-specific circumstances, compliance with
UNCLOS article 244 may be altogether excluded. There are two alternative conclusions
that can be drawn from this: on the one hand, the position can be held that MSR is the legal
basis for bioprospecting as a high seas freedom, but that intellectual property legislation
currently prevents the effective implementation of the obligations to publish research
156 Gorina-Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific Research, 2003, p. 415.
157 Tvedt, "Patent Law and Bioprospecting in Antarctica", 2010, p. 51, citing Regulations Under the Budapest
Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent
Procedures [Budapest Treaty Regulations], WIPO, 28 April 1977, rules 9.2 and 11.
158 See Tvedt, "Patent Law and Bioprospecting in Antarctica", 2010, making the point that the patent system
runs counter to publication requirements under the Antarctic Treaty.
159 This may be different for research undertaken in the Area, where dissemination of research results and
analysis shall be made “when available”. See UNCLOS, article 143(3)(c).
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results. This would mean there is an implementation gap concerning existing benefit-
sharing mechanisms applicable to bioprospecting as MSR. On the other hand, the
implementation gap can be seen as an argument against considering bioprospecting as a
form of MSR: it can be stated that since the patent procedures following bioprospecting
work against important obligations under the MSR regime, the reasons for considering this
activity as part of MSR are less compelling.
2.1.2.4. Bioprospecting as MSR: MSR as a basis for patent claims
Pursuant to article 241, marine scientific research activities “shall not constitute the legal
basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its resources”.160 For the case
in which bioprospecting is considered to be MSR, the question is whether this provision
prevents states and their nationals from seeking or granting patents based on inventions
from high seas biological material. As will be shown, this is a controversial question.
The term “any claim” is broad. A claim can mean a “demand for a remedy or assertion of a
right”.161 The inclusion of the word “any” would suggest that a broad meaning is intended,
and that both public and private claims are comprised therein.162 A patent claim is a legal
proprietary title whose validity is sanctioned by a public authority and which is enforceable
in relation to other natural and legal persons. A patent claim would according to the
ordinary meaning of the term constitute a claim.163
The term “marine environment” is equally broad. Article 241 is placed under Section 1 of
Part XIII, entitled “[g]eneral provisions”, and therefore applies generally to MSR untaken
in all parts of the ocean, including the high seas. A possible interpretation could be that
since no exception is made to the effect, the marine environment of the seabed would also
160 [emphasis added]
161 A Dictionary of Law, 2009, sub verbo "claim".
162 Whether a patent claim should be classified as private or public is debatable. For the purposes of the issue
discussed here, no such classification is necessary, as both private and public claims are comprised in the
broad “any claim” according to the ordinary meaning of the term.
163 See Gorina-Ysern, Legal Issues Raised by Profitable Biotechnology Development Through Marine
Scientific Research, 2003. She considers that IPR constitute a claim in relation to article 241.
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be included in “the marine environment”. The “resources” of the marine environment
would, according to a natural understanding of the term, comprise both living and non-
living resources of the marine environment, both macroorganisms and microorganisms.
Claims to the mineral resources of the Area follow the provisions under Part XI.
Concerning the biological resources of the seabed in ABNJ, it can be argued that they are
also resources of the marine environment in relation to this provision. As the narrow
definition of “resources” in the Area as mineral resources applies only to Part XI164 a
possible interpretation is that article 241 also applies to the MSR conducted on the seabed
in ABNJ. Regarding the resources of the high seas, there is little room for diverging
options. The biological resources in the high seas are resources of the marine environment.
It is “marine scientific research activities” that cannot lawfully constitute a “legal basis” for
a claim. It can be argued that the marine scientific research activities are not the basis for a
patent claim itself: what obtains exclusivity through the claim is not the marine resource
sampled by MSR activities, but rather the subsequent intellectual endeavour taking place in
mainland laboratories and testing facilities.165 To this it may be interjected that the MSR
activities are a prerequisite for the mainland activities. A possible yet highly controversial
position is that the close link between MSR and subsequent intellectual endeavours is an
argument that should lead to considering MSR as the legal basis for patent claims.
The wording in article 241 is open to two opposite interpretations. It is therefore necessary
to further examine state practice and the context in which the article was adopted. The draft
proposals, as received by Sub-committee III of the Sea-Bed Committee, vary with regards
to what kind of claims MSR could not lead to and which areas of sea the provision would
apply to.166 As there is little doubt that the final text applies to ABNJ, it is the nature of the
164 UNCLOS, article 133 states that “For the purposes of this part […] ”resources” means […] mineral
resources”.
165 Wegelein argues along this line, stating that “acquired data of any scientific research do not necessarily
qualify as intellectual property as they only represent facts, the conclusions drawn from them are […]
copyrighted material. […] The individual achievement of the scientist must be distinguished from the raw
data”. Wegelein, Marine Scientific Research, 2005, p. 119.
166 Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary. Articles 192 to 278,
1991, p. 464.
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claims which are excluded for this zone that is of most interest here. The initial proposal,
submitted by Canada, stated that MSR “as such shall not form the legal basis for any claims
of exploitation rights or any other rights in areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction”. 167 Another proposal by Malta stated that scientific research “shall not
constitute a legal basis for any jurisdictional claims with regard to ocean space or its
resources”.168 The further negotiations resulted in two proposals in 1973. One reflects the
Canadian proposal and the other is broader and reflects the later text of article 241, though
containing the words (marine scientific research activities) “as such”. In 1974, a further
draft proposed that MSR activities should not “form the legal basis for any claim
whatsoever to any part of the marine environment or its resources”. Subsequently, the term
“whatsoever” was excluded, and “shall not form” was replaced with “shall not
constitute”.169
Through this examination of preparatory works, one may not conclude as to whether the
authors of this part of the Convention intended to regulate patenting claims resulting from
MSR. As modern biotechnology was in its infancy, it would appear that the issue of
patenting and MSR were not discussed or were not a main concern. What may be
concluded from the negotiations, however, was that parties deliberately adopted a wide
understanding of the term “claim”, including both jurisdictional claims and claims of
exclusive exploration and exploitation of the resources of another state.170 Wegelein argues
that article 241 could not have been intended to exclude IPR, as scientific research “would
become meaningless from the standpoint of scientific activity”171 and that scientists want
their findings associated with their names. This argument is based on a presumption that
IPR are the main, or even the only, incentive to conduct MSR. This cannot be entirely true,
considering the value of the “study” of the marine environment recognised in UNCLOS172
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid., p. 465.
170 Gorina-Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific Research, 2003, p. 363.
171 Wegelein, Marine Scientific Research, 2005, p. 119.
172 UNCLOS, preamble, paragraph 5.
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and the many expeditions undertaken to further human understanding of the oceans and
marine life.
Importantly, there are no indications of state practice since the adoption of the Convention
to support an interpretation of article 241 as excluding patenting of inventions that result
from MSR. 173 This does not however eliminate the possibility that an evolutionary
interpretation may lead to an understanding of the provision that is more in line with what
the ordinary meaning of the terms could suggest. On the other hand, such an interpretation
risks running counter to state obligations under patent law. UNCLOS provides that the
Convention “shall not alter the rights and obligations of State Parties” arising under other
agreements which are compatible with UNCLOS and “which do not affect the enjoyment
by other State Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this
Convention”.174 UNCLOS and the TRIPS Agreement are compatible as long as compliance
with the TRIPS Agreement does not affect the exercise by a state of its obligations under
UNCLOS.175 Accordingly, it is not likely that an understanding of article 241 preventing
patents from high seas MSR can develop without substantial changes in patent law. This
would, for instance, require a change of the current legal situation where patent law is not
concerned with the provenance of the material and a resolution of the question of
disclosure of origin.
To sum up these discussions on bioprospecting and MSR, it can be stated that there are
compelling arguments for considering MSR as the legal ground for bioprospecting as a
high seas freedom. For those bioprospecting cruises that are conducted without commercial
intent and that do not result in subsequent commercial applications, there is no reason to
consider the activity as anything but MSR. For those cruises that are conducted with
commercial intent or result in commercial application, the answer is less certain. The
wording in Part XIII does not indicate that parties intended to exclude commercial
173 See e.g. Gorina-Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific Research, 2003, p. 364.
174 UNCLOS, article 311, paragraph 2. The TRIPS Agreement does not contain a similar provision.
175 Salpin and Germani, "Patenting of Research Results Related to Genetic Resources from Areas beyond
National Jurisdiction", 2007, p. 20.
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research. Yet, some of the more concrete MSR obligations seem not to fit very well with
the practices of exclusivity and secrecy in bioprospecting. This can be interpreted as an
implementation deficit of Part XIII. Alternatively, this seeming discrepancy can be seen as
an argument against considering MSR as the legal grounds for lawful bioprospecting.
Taking this position does not mean that bioprospecting is not permitted under the law of the
sea. The next section examines what the legal basis for bioprospecting then may be.
2.1.3. A freedom sui generis
Article 87, as previously stated, does not provide an exhaustive list of freedoms of the high
seas. For the case where one does not retain the view that bioprospecting is either a form of
fishing or MSR, the question still remains of whether bioprospecting is a distinct form of
high seas freedom. If so, the conditions applicable to this freedom must be established.
2.1.3.1. Analogies and norms of the law of the sea
A first remark is that the activity of bioprospecting bears resemblance to permitted high
seas activities. It can therefore be argued that analogies from such listed freedoms may
have the consequence that bioprospecting is considered a freedom of the high seas. The
harvesting of marine living resources is open to all, subject to environmental obligations
found in Section 2 of Part VII. Marine scientific research is at the very least sanctioned for
basic scientific research. Bioprospecting does entail using methods closely resembling
traditional MSR, yet with a divergent objective. Still, a commercial intent or objective is
not itself a persuasive argument for dismissing the activity as a high seas freedom:
exploiting the living resources for commercial gain is clearly an instance of such freedom
exerted when engaging in high seas fisheries.
Perhaps more important than the analogies that may be drawn from the listed freedoms, is
the absence of norms in international law ruling out bioprospecting as a freedom of the
high seas. Broggiato explains how during the 20 years of exploitation of marine GR in
ABNJ through sampling, there have not been allegations in the diplomatic debate that this
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practice is unlawful.176 The absence of objections to the legality of this activity is a strong
argument for considering bioprospecting as a freedom of the high seas. State practice
appears consistent in this respect and of a duration that is as long as the history of marine
bioprospecting in ABNJ. 177 There is accordingly little doubt that bioprospecting is a
permitted use of the high seas. A more difficult question that arises is that of the principles
under which bioprospecting can take place in the high seas.
2.1.3.2. Applicable conditions
For the case that bioprospecting is not considered as a high seas freedom by virtue of MSR,
but on a separate basis, it can first be noted that the activity is subject to the general
conditions applicable to all activities in the high seas. This means that bioprospecting may
only be conducted for peaceful purposes. 178 As seen above, though bioprospecting is
different from mere navigation, general provisions pertaining to flying the flag of a state
are also applicable.179 States must furthermore show “due regard for the interests of other
States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas”.180 What “due regard” entails is not
further specified in the treaty text.181 The obligation to show due regard for the interests of
other states can be seen in relation to the general principle of cooperation between states. It
can also be viewed as a duty to take into concern the rights accorded by the treaty to other
states.
Another question is whether not considering bioprospecting as a sub-category to MSR
means that all provisions relating to MSR lose all binding force upon states and their
nationals who perform bioprospecting simply because a commercial application is
176 Broggiato, "Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction", 2011, p. 36. Her argument refers in
particular to sampling in the deep seas of ABNJ. See also Leary, "International Law and the Genetic
Resources of the Deep Sea", 2009, p. 362.
177 On the elements of international custom, see Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2003,
pp. 6-12.
178 UNCLOS, article 88.
179 See above, section 2.1.1.
180 UNCLOS, article 87(2).
181 A similar expression, “reasonable regard”, is found in UNCLOS, article 147 concerning the Area and in
article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.
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developed at a later stage or a commercial intent can be established. It can be argued that
because bioprospecting encompasses steps and procedures that are typical of, if not
identical to, MSR activities, bioprospecting should be conducted in accordance with the
general principles found in article 240. A first principle is that MSR shall be conducted
exclusively for peaceful purposes. 182 This principle has its high seas counterpart in
article 88, which applies to all activities. The next general principle is that MSR shall be
conducted “with appropriate scientific methods and means” compatible with UNCLOS.183
Even in the presence of a clear commercial intent, this intent does not eliminate the
otherwise scientific procedures used in sampling activities. The general objective of the
Convention to conserve oceanic resources184 is an argument for applying this provision also
to bioprospecting as a distinct high seas freedom. The same can be stated for achieving
effective implementation of the objective of article 240.
As a further general principle, MSR shall be conducted in “compliance with all relevant
regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention including those for the protection
and preservation of the marine environment”.185 Section 2 of Part VII on the conservation
and management of living resources applies to the activity of bioprospecting irrespective of
whether the legal basis for the activity is MSR or something else. Whether other MSR
relevant regulations would apply also to bioprospecting would depend on a further
examination of that regulation.
Also as a general principle, MSR shall not “unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate
uses of the sea” and it shall be “duly respected” in the course of such other uses.186 A first
remark is that bioprospecting is as an example of such a legitimate use of the high seas.
When mutual respect is warranted for MSR and bioprospecting, there is less need to
182 UNCLOS, article 240(a).
183 Ibid., article 240(b).
184 Ibid., preamble, paragraph 5.
185 Ibid., article 240(d).
186 Ibid., article 240(c).
42
discuss whether analogies should be drawn from this principle.187 The qualifying term
“unjustifiable” can suggest that some interference might occur, as long as it is not
unlawful. This can be seen in relation with the general principle of fulfilling obligations in
good faith and refraining from abuses of rights.188 As pertains to the high seas, it can also
be seen as an expression of the obligation to show “due regard for the interest of other
states”.189
A further question that can be raised is what the due respect that must be displayed for
MSR means for the activity of bioprospecting. An example of a scenario where the
question might arise is when bioprospecting has led to a patented gene sequence that is
later sampled again by other persons through MSR. A possible way to see this situation is
as one where bioprospecting blocks subsequent MSR, as the right to “make” or “use” a
gene sequence or microorganism is now subject under patent law to the consent of the
patentee.190 What is considered an infringement of the rights of the patentee will invariably
depend on an interpretation of the claim and the relevant patent law. The TRIPS Agreement
opens up for domestic legislation to make exemptions to the scope of the exclusive rights
conferred so long as exemptions do “not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation
of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner”.191 Generally, research undertaken to understand a patented invention or to conduct
experiments on the invention can be permitted.192 A study undertaken by the Organisation
of Economic Co-operation and Development shows that the extent of the exemptions
offered in domestic legislations vary.193 In relation to the subsequent MSR, this means that
187 An interpretation of the words “unjustifiable” and “duly” may lead to the conclusion that the required
mutual respect would entail that the exact same level of non-interference or respect is required.
188 UNCLOS, article 300.
189 Ibid., article 87(2).
190 TRIPS Agreement, article 28(1)(a), for the case of a product. In theory, albeit less practical, the question
can also arise as an infringement of the exclusive right to “import”, where sufficient purification or change
to the organism has happened during the cruise at high seas.
191 Ibid., article 30.
192 See e.g. Stenvik, Patenters beskyttelsesomfang, 2001, p. 120; Salpin and Germani, "Patenting of Research
Results Related to Genetic Resources from Areas beyond National Jurisdiction", 2007, p. 21. See also the
so-called Stockpiling Case concerning research exemptions in Canadian law, Canada – Patent Protection
of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, 17 March 2000.
193 Dent, et al., Research Use of Patented Knowledge, OECD STI, 2006 (STI Working Paper 2), pp. 17-22.
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how far the researching endeavour may go without infringement is determined by country-
specific research exemptions or lack of such. At least in theory, subsequent research on
sampled material can constitute an infringement where MSR leads researchers to
synthetically reproduce a sequence that they have sampled but which is already patented.
What’s more, infringement may also occur where MSR researchers make or use a close
derivative of the patented sequence if the patent covers this.
If MSR were blocked in some way, this blockage would not constitute “due respect” for
(pure) MSR. Yet, even if this general principle of article 240(c) were implemented in the
relevant domestic legislation, it would probably provide little resistance to the rights
conferred by a valid patent claim in a civil case, especially since article 240 does not award
rights to private parties. An interpretation by which these different instruments of
international law can be harmonised is by simply considering MSR as stopping when the
cruise is over and excluding subsequent research. Choosing this point for cessation in time
of MSR would evidently not apply to all activities, as for example publication duties still
await upon return. According to this line of interpretation, MSR rights such as access to
high seas and the “due respect” through its course apply only while at sea, while
obligations apply both during and after a cruise.
Concerning bioprospecting as something distinct from MSR, the issue of rights and
obligations subsequent to the cruise can be raised. More particularly, the question is
whether the MSR obligation to publish and disseminate results can be given normative
value for the activity of bioprospecting. First of all, the effective implementation of
article 240 and the objective of spreading knowledge among parties are arguments for
considering that publication obligations also apply to bioprospecting. Yet, these are
arguments based on the close resemblance of MSR and bioprospecting. If the firm position
has been taken that bioprospecting is not MSR, the particularities of this activity have to be
taken into consideration. A commercial intent or the subsequent commercial use of the
biological material may require discretion in order to achieve the success being sought. Not
surprisingly, there is no counterpart to article 244 found in Part VII that can support
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publication as a general principle applicable to high seas activities. 194 Unlike the
obligations to use appropriate scientific methods, which were stated above as probably also
applying to bioprospecting, disseminating information on commercial applications does not
have the same direct impact on the high seas environment. On the contrary, impact
primarily lies in a greater range of inventions available. It would appear that there is no
obligation to publish results to be drawn from the treaty text. The answer to this question
may however depend on the value attributed to Part XIV, which concerns transfer of
marine technology. This concept will be explored in the following section.
2.1.3.3 Transfer of technology
Part XIV, entitled “Development and Transfer of Marine Technology”, is closely related to
MSR and is usually discussed as a part of the MSR regime.195 Yet the Convention does not
make technology transfer obligations depend specifically on MSR. The provisions would
therefore be as relevant for bioprospecting as for (pure) MSR. In this part, a redistributive
principle is established. States have the general obligation, directly or through competent
international organisations, to “cooperate in accordance with their capabilities to promote
actively the development and transfer of marine science and marine technology” and to
“endeavour to foster the economic and legal conditions for the transfer of marine
technology for the benefit of all parties concerned on an equitable basis”.196 Equivalent
principles can be found in the CBD197 and the TRIPS Agreement,198 though with various
levels of specificity regarding party obligations.
As a result of the great resistance from developed states during the negotiations of
UNCLOS, Part XIV of the Convention lacks specific obligations and has been described as
194 But see UNCLOS, article 118. It concerns co-operation in the conservation of living resources. This issue
will be discussed below. See section 2.2.2.
195 See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 404.
196 UNCLOS, article 266, paragraphs 1 and 3.
197 CBD, article 16(2) provides that technology transfer to developing countries shall be facilitated. Where the
technology is subject to IPR, transfer shall be “consistent with the adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights.” See Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2003, p. 1045.
198 TRIPS Agreement, article 66(2) provides that developed states “shall provide incentives” to their nationals
to encourage technology transfer to the least developed member states.
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a pactum de contrahendo.199 The limited practical impact of the provisions on technology
transfer can be illustrated by the fact that in promoting transfer, states shall have due regard
to all legitimate interests, including the rights of holders and suppliers of marine
technology.200 Patents may be one such legitimate interest preventing transfer of marine
technology from bioprospecting to developing states. Rights conferred by patents trump a
state obligation to “endeavour to foster” technology transfer in case of a conflict. Several
international organisations are engaged in promoting technology transfer.201 On a bilateral
level it is more difficult to establish the extent to which these general principles are being
complied with. However, several parties to UNCLOS now consider Part XIV to be the part
of the Convention with the gravest implementation gap.202
Yet irrespective of its limited practical impact, it should be highlighted that the principle of
technology transfer envisages a transaction from those possessing benefits to those who
only do so to a lesser degree. Accordingly, it is a form of benefit-sharing. In relation to
later discussions below and the aim of this thesis to provide regulatory alternatives for high
seas ABS, this observation is important. Part XIV shows that ABS is not a concept alien to
the regime of the high seas, which may provide hope to ABS proponents. The lesson
learned from Part XIV is also that for any ABS regime to be effectively implemented it
must take patent law into account.
To sum up these discussions on the framework for bioprospecting through an activity
perspective, recourse to regulation of activities as a legislative technique is widely present
in the high seas regime. Yet UNCLOS remains a framework convention, and new types of
marine activities pose challenges for the interpretation of the Convention. Despite the many
substantial provisions applicable to high seas activities, firm answers to important
questions cannot always be provided. The correct legal basis for conducting bioprospecting
199 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 418.
200 UNCLOS, article 267.
201 United Nations Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, 2011
(A/66/70), paragraphs 197-210.
202 Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter Dated 30 June 2011 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad
Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, United Nations
General Assembly, 2011 (A/66/119), paragraph 36.
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in the high seas is the most prominent of these questions. Adopting a resource perspective
will complement these discussions and contribute to further understanding of the rights and
obligations applicable to bioprospecting in the high seas.
2.2. Current framework applicable to the resources used in bioprospecting
Adopting a resource perspective is here understood as examining the law relevant to the
biological resources used in bioprospecting. First, provisions regulating these resources in
the high seas will be sought established. Subsequently, questions of bioprospecting in
waters bordering other zones of jurisdiction will be discussed.
2.2.1. Status of marine biological material in the high seas
UNCLOS is strikingly silent when it comes to addressing the legal status of biological
resources in the high seas. In comparison, the mineral resources of the Area are “common
heritage of mankind”.203 The lack of corresponding declarations for the high seas has to be
seen in relation to the general principle of the freedom of the high seas and the freedom of
fishing.204 The debate on use and appropriation of the seas goes back to the 17th century
with the expansion of the horizon and the battle over mare liberum as opposed to mare
clausum.205 The former doctrine prevailed. Its most prominent ambassador, Hugo Grotius,
argued that the sea is open as a res communis, and common things, like the air or the sea,
cannot be occupied.206 Today, the biological resources of the ocean are considered as
common pool resources.207 In the high seas, entitlement to the material may follow from
harvest or other forms of exploitation. This is in contrast to the situation under the EEZ,
where states may have exclusive or common property rights over resources.208 Exploitation
of fish in the high seas as a common pool resource has had a harmful effect on many fish
203 UNCLOS, article 136.
204 Ibid., article 87.
205 See e.g Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 204.
206 Grotius and Vervliet, Mare Liberum 1609-2009: Original Latin Text (Facsimile of the First Edition, 1609)
and Modern English Translation, 2009, pp. XV, 49-95.
207 Barnes, "Entitlement to Marine Living Resources", 2010, p. 86, who discusses the potential of regulating
activities in ABNJ through property rights-based entitlements.
208 See Hannesson, The Privatization of the Oceans, 2004, pp. 51-56.
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stocks, and can be described in the words of Garret Hardin as a tragedy of the commons.209
Overexploitation is one of the reasons why the freedom of the high seas is not an absolute
freedom. From a resource perspective, the conditions applicable to exploitation of marine
living resources in the high seas are the most important limitations of this freedom.
2.2.2. Environmental standards applicable to marine biological material
Environmental standards applicable to marine living resources in the high seas are found in
both Part XII and Section 2 of Part VII. To a certain extent, legislative emphasis is put on
the protection of living resources, albeit primarily as obligations that follow from
conducting an activity.
As a general principle applicable to all zones of jurisdiction, article 192 sets forth the
obligation for states to “protect and preserve” the marine environment. States furthermore
have the duty to take “all measures that are consistent with this Convention to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment”. 210 “Pollution of the marine
environment” is defined as the “introduction by man […] of substances or energy into the
marine environment, which […] is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to
living resources and marine life, […] and reduction of amenities”.211 On a general note,
bioprospecting is no more likely to introduce harmful substances into the marine
environment than navigation. 212 However, in situ prospecting in the deep sea could
introduce alien elements such as light and noise. 213 This could be considered as an
introduction of energy into the marine environment and thus constitute pollution. Yet
209 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", 1968.
210 UNCLOS, article 194(1).
211 Ibid., article 1(1)(4).
212 For an introduction to issues of shipping and the environmental regulation in UNCLOS, see Blanco-
Bazán, "The Environmental UNCLOS and the Work of IMO in the Field of Prevention of Pollution from
Vessels", 2003.
213 Leary, "Bioprospecting and the Genetic Resources of Hydrothermal Vents on The High Seas", 2004,
p. 167; Warner, Protecting the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the International Law
Framework, 2009, p. 20.
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compared to other forms of marine pollution and the modest scale of current
bioprospecting, the threat of pollution seems to be a marginal issue.214
UNCLOS provides environmental standards for the conservation of marine living
resources. Section 2 of Part VII is particularly crafted for the conservation of fish stocks,215
yet the scope of application for articles 117 to 119 is living resources in the high seas in
general. Were bioprospecting, today or at later stage, found to trigger particular
conservation measures under inter alia articles 192 or 117, taking such measures can be
done either by states alone or in co-operation. The element of co-operation is specified in
article 118 as a duty to co-operate regarding “conservation and management of marine
resources in the areas of high seas” and, if nationals of several states operate in the same
area, to negotiate on necessary measures.216
Article 117 charges states with a duty to take “such measures for their respective nationals
as may be necessary for the conservation of living resources in the high seas”.217 The term
“may be necessary” reflects a duty that is dynamic in the sense that what may not have
been necessary when the Convention was adopted may be so today. Further guidance in the
interpretation of what may be necessary is not offered by UNCLOS. Modern environmental
principles, such as the application of “best scientific evidence available” 218 and the
ecosystem approach, 219 are referred to. But the wording suggests that these enter the
equation not when determining if measures are necessary, but as guiding principles for the
modalities of these measures. Other environmental norms, such as the requirement to
undertake environmental impact assessments for activities that have a significant adverse
impact, may complement UNCLOS provisions as norms of customary law.220
214 See Ramirez-Llodra, et al., "Man and the Last Great Wilderness: Human Impact on the Deep Sea", 2011.
215 See UNCLOS, article 116.
216 Ibid., article 118.
217 Ibid., article 117.
218 Ibid., article 119(1)(a).
219 Ibid., article 119(1)(b). The provision does not employ the expression “ecosystem approach, but speaks of
species that are “associated with or dependent” on harvested species.
220 This probably is the situation for nodule prospecting the Area, see Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities
and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No.
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This raises the question of whether bioprospecting triggers particular conservation
obligations. While knowledge of the environmental impact of bioprospecting is still
incomplete, bioprospecting is generally referred to as an activity of limited or minimal
environmental impact. It can concern quite literally just a drop in the ocean. Again from a
pragmatic point of view, bioprospecting is a significantly less destructive activity than
others, such as overexploitation of fish stocks. 221 Concern has been voiced regarding
repeated expeditions in the deep-sea or collecting great quantities of a targeted material,
particularly in sensitive ecosystems.222 There are examples of agreements of co-operation
between marine scientists, in order to avoid repeated expeditions to the same deep-sea
sites. 223 Such agreements are voluntary and not comprehensive. Regarding marine
bioprospecting in the drug industry, Hunt and Vincent describe initial sampling as requiring
small quantities to determine if a compound registers bioactivity and may produce a “hit”,
which may in turn be developed into a candidate for pre-clinical trials, called a “lead”. The
quantities then sampled in secondary collection may vary. There are examples of secondary
collections of several metric tons resulting in only a few grams of an active compound.
Technological advancements probably make such collections less likely, such that only a
one and a half kilograms of collection of a sponge yields sufficient amounts of the targeted
compound to allow preclinical trials.224 At this scale, this activity would not, in normal
circumstances and ecosystems, trigger particular measures under UNCLOS article 117. In
sensitive ecosystems, however, particular measures may be warranted depending on the
specific situation of a cruise and the ecological circumstances.
17, Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 1 February 2011,
paragraph 148. The validity of the argument for activities in the high seas is less certain.
221 On overfishing in the last century, see Ausubel, First Census of Marine Life: Highlights of a Decade of
History, 2010, p. 27.
222 See e.g. Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea, 2007, p. 189.
223 Glowka, "Putting Marine Scientific Research on a Sustainable Footing at Hydrothermal Vents", 2003,
p. 308; Warner, Protecting the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the International Law
Framework, 2009, p. 21; Hayes, "Charismatic Microfauna", 2007, p. 697.
224 Hunt and Vicent, "Scale and Sustainability of Marine Bioprospecting for Pharmaceuticals", 2006, pp. 58-
59. See also Farrier and Tucker, "Access to Marine Bioresources", 2001, p. 218.
50
Resource regulation under UNCLOS applies irrespectively of whether the high seas
resources are found in surface water or at several thousand meters depth. Concerning the
resources of the seabed, however, the legal situation may differ. The next section will
explore the legal issues arising when the regime of the high seas meets the regime of the
continental shelf.
2.2.3. Resource regulation: navigating in the muddy waters of the continental shelf
Bioprospecting at great depths is interesting for a number of reasons. From the viewpoint
of science and industry, great depths may promise great discoveries. High pressure can in
itself be an indicator of marine life that has developed particular characteristics to adapt
this climate. The greats depths are also the location for many hydrothermal vents,
seamounts, cold seeps, and deep water coral reefs that create biotopes that are particularly
rich in biodiversity and thus highly interesting for bioprospectors.225 Sedentary species are
viewed today as most interesting because they often have developed chemical compounds
that can, for instance, deter predators and parasites.226 The most recent estimate indicates
that at least 14 companies have been involved in bioprospecting for deep-sea genetic
resources. 227 It can therefore be assumed that the legal status of resources in waters
bordering the continental shelf and the high seas may be of practical interest. From a legal
point of view, the bioprospecting in this area poses questions of interpretation concerning
which natural resources belong to which legal regime. These questions will be explored in
the following.
Resource regulation pertaining to the continental shelf is found in UNCLOS Part VI.
Exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the continental shelf is the sovereign right
of the coastal state.228 Article 78 provides that coastal state rights over the continental shelf
225 See Leary, "Bioprospecting and the Genetic Resources of Hydrothermal Vents on The High Seas", 2004;
Scovazzi, "The Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction: General and Institutional Aspects",
2010, p. 48.
226 Arico and Salpin, Bioprospecting of Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed, 2005, p. 30.
227 Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea, 2007, p. 163. The author also
reckons that at least six of these companies have marketed products from these resources.
228 UNCLOS, article 77(1).
51
do not “affect the legal status of the superjacent waters” above the continental shelf.229
From this, there is an adjacency of the regime of the continental shelf, and of the high seas
where there is no EEZ that extends beyond the continental shelf.230
Article 77 provides that exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the continental
shelf require the “express consent” of the coastal state.231 Read separately, this would entail
that all bioprospecting that comprises continental shelf material would be subject to coastal
state consent. Read in context with the definition of “natural resources” of the continental
shelf, the question is more complex. These are defined as “mineral and other non-living
resources of the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof together with living organisms belonging to
sedentary species”. 232 A nearly identical definition is found the Convention on the
Continental Shelf.233 Leary explains that these two main groups of resources reflect two
very separate legal traditions.234 The mineral and other non-living resources refer to the
doctrine of unilateral claims to oil and mineral resources of the continental shelf made after
1945. The reference to sedentary species reflects another form of claims, which can be
traced back to the mid-19th century when the first states made harvesting claims to
sedentary species beyond the narrow strip of the territorial sea.235 The question is how the
terms as they appear in UNCLOS today affect the obligation to obtain coastal state consent
for bioprospecting close to the continental shelf where this extends beyond the EEZ.
A first remark that can be made is that non-sedentary species are not part of the “resources
of the continental shelf”. These are resources of the high seas (or the EEZ). Harvesting
these species would not require coastal state consent. Sedentary species are defined as
“organisms which, at the harvestable state, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or
229 Ibid., article 78(1).
230 Ibid., articles 86 and 57.
231 Ibid., article 77(2).
232 Ibid., article 77(4).
233 Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 2(4).
234 Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea, 2007, pp. 79-94. See also Prows,
"Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of Unclos Property Law (and What Is to Be Done
About It)", 2007, pp. 251-258.
235 Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea, 2007, pp. 82-84.
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are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed”.236 Allen points
out that this definition has little or no relationship with biological taxonomy. 237 The
qualifying term “harvestable state” is not further defined in the treaty text. One ordinary
meaning of the words suggests they be in a condition of ripeness for harvesting. This
entails a notion of being sufficiently developed for collection that may be reasonable for
harvest by fishing. Applied to the context of harvest by bioprospecting, on the other hand,
identification of “harvestable state” may become more problematic. Determining the
“harvestable state” of e.g. bacteria is a challenge. In situations of exploratory sampling,
such as in bioprospecting, the characteristics of species are unknown prior to the collection.
Knowing in advance whether these are at a “harvestable state” may be difficult.
Sedentary species are furthermore those which are “immobile” or “unable to move except
in constant physical contact with the sea-bed”, which are also criticised criteria.238 Again,
the on-site classification calls for considerable prior knowledge of the characteristics of the
biological material. Also, for the case of living resources in mid-oceanic ridges and their
hydrothermal vents, regimes may overlap: as Leary points out, the hydrothermal plume
often extends to hundreds of metres in the water column above and around hydrothermal
vents. Within one ecosystem there will be both macrofauna and microfauna that fall within
and outside the scope of sedentary species.239 Consent will be required for harvesting some
of these species, but not for others.240 This means that the boundaries of the applicable legal
regimes do not coincide with the ecological boundaries of deep-sea ecosystems.241
The easy way out is of course to obtain the express consent of the coastal state. If not, legal
navigation in the waters of somewhat impractical definitions makes access to these high
236 UNCLOS, article 77(4).
237 Allen, "Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International Law Issues in Deep-Sea Vent Resource
Conservation and Management", 2001, p. 621.
238 Leary, "Bioprospecting and the Genetic Resources of Hydrothermal Vents on The High Seas", 2004,
p. 150. See also Allen, "Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden", 2001, pp. 624-625, who discusses
diverging state practices on specie mobility.
239 Leary, "Bioprospecting and the Genetic Resources of Hydrothermal Vents on The High Seas", 2004.
240 On the ecosystems of the deep-seabed, see generally Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources
of the Deep Sea, 2007, pp. 7-27.
241 From the perspective of coastal states, the question arises of how to adequately protect these resources, see
Mossop, "Protecting Marine Biodiversity on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles", 2007.
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seas resources theoretically possible, but demands a great amount of knowledge. The
definition of article 77 is a further example of the practical problem in applying provisions
that were not crafted for bioprospecting to this activity.
Bioprospecting at great depths is also a question of access to the vast seabed beyond the
continental shelf. The next section aims to explore the legal framework for bioprospecting
in waters bordering the high seas and the Area.
2.2.4. Bioprospecting at great depths: closing in on the Area
The Area is defined in UNCLOS article 1(1) as “the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. UNCLOS Part XI, as modified by the
Implementation Agreement,242 establishes a regime for activities in the Area that is distinct
from that of the high seas.243 The task here is to identify the resource regulation in place for
biological material in waters bordering the Area and the high seas.
Part XI establishes an elaborate framework for access to, and sharing of, the resources of
the Area.244 Article 136 states as a fundamental principle that the Area and its resources are
“the common heritage of mankind”. No state can claim or exercise sovereign rights over
“the Area or its resources”, nor are these resources subject to appropriation by states and
persons. 245 Part XI establishes a separate governing body, the International Seabed
Authority (ISA), which will act on behalf of “mankind as a whole” concerning the
resources of the Area.246 Yet, as mentioned above, article 133 stipulates that the resources
of the Area are “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or
242 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 [Implementation Agreement Relating to Part XI], United Nations, 16 November
1994, 1836 UNTS 3.
243 UNCLOS, article 134(2) states that “activities in the Area shall be governed by the provisions of this
part”.
244 On the historic development that led to the creation of this new regime, see Churchill and Lowe, The Law
of the Sea, 1999, pp. 224-238.
245 UNCLOS, article 137(1).
246 Ibid., article 137(2).
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beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules”.247 Biological resources are thus not
considered “resources” in relation to Part XI. The mandate of the ISA extends to managing
the “resources of the Area”, but not biological resources on the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction. This demarcation has its background in the context in which UNCLOS was
negotiated. At the time, immense expectations were held for the commercial prospects of
deep-sea mining.248 To date, no commercial exploitation of the mineral resources from the
deep-sea has taken place under the auspices of the ISA. This is due, among other factors, to
the immensely high costs of seabed mining compared to land-based mining and the costs of
development of technologies to conduct mining in such hostile environments. 249
Bioprospecting, although expensive, is on the other hand currently taking place in deep-sea
environments. The situation has been described as “the deepest of ironies” 250 : the
international community has established an elaborate system for resources that are not
currently exploitable, but resources that are being exploited are not explicitly regulated.
This raises the question of what framework applies for the biological resources of the
seabed. Treves synthesises several positions that are held by states: some see the regime of
the Area as comprising biological resources, on the basis of an analogy from “sedentary
species” being included in the regime of the continental shelf. Others approach the question
from article 143, which provides that MSR in the Area shall be conducted “for the benefit
of mankind as a whole”.251 This approach, however, calls for agreement on the issue of
whether bioprospecting is indeed MSR or not. If one retains the idea that bioprospecting is
a form of MSR, this approach could be a fruitful point of departure, securing open access
and publication of research results and linking this to the objectives of the benefit of
humankind. As a counter-argument to such an approach is the context in which the
provisions on the Area are found; a clear distinction is drawn between MSR and
247 Ibid., article 133(a). [emphasis added]
248 See the speech held by the Maltese ambassador to the UN, Arvid Pardo, launching the concept of the
common heritage of mankind: United Nations General Assembly, Agenda Item 92, 1967; Leary,
"International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea", 2009, p. 355.
249 Scovazzi, "The Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction: General and Institutional Aspects",
2010, p. 49.
250 Glowka, "The Deepest of Ironies", 1996.
251 Treves, "Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction",
2010, p. 17.
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prospecting for mineral resources. A contextual interpretation could then suggest that a
distinction of pure and applied research should be upheld also for biological resources. Yet,
well after the discovery of commercial applications to deep-sea marine biological
resources, no changes were made or suggested to incorporate biological resources by the
Implementation Agreement.252 The views currently expressed by states can be seen as more
strategic than expressions on the current legal status.253 They reflect the need to refrain
from making concessions too early for the case of future regulations of biological material
in ABNJ.254 The likely conclusion is therefore that the biological resources of the Area are
not “common heritage of mankind” resources, and that they currently are regulated by the
high seas regime, as reflected in UNCLOS and customary law. At the same time, the
answer to this question cannot be given categorically, as a great number of states express a
different understanding of international law. Though for the time being, the difficult task of
distinguishing seabed and the high seas biological resources is an exercise that is more
relevant in relation to the continental shelf than to the Area.
2.3. Closing remarks on the legal framework applicable to bioprospecting
Bioprospecting is an activity that can lawfully take place in the high seas, yet it is subject to
a number of conditions. By adopting an activity perspective, it has been shown that
obligations under UNCLOS vary depending on the legal grounds for exerting a freedom of
the high seas. Currently, there is no definite answer to whether the legal basis for
bioprospecting is MSR or something else. There may be a conflict between intellectual
property law and the effective implementation of UNCLOS for both cases. This conflict is
apparent when the Convention provides for benefits to be shared, through publishing of
research results or promoting technology transfer. These existing benefit-sharing
mechanisms and their practical shortcomings must be noted as a foundation for de lege
ferenda discussions on ABS for high seas bioprospecting.
252 Hayes, "Charismatic Microfauna", 2007, p. 688.
253 Treves, "Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction",
2010, p. 17.
254 Ibid.
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By adopting a resource perspective, it has been shown that biological material in the high
seas may be freely exploited by bioprospectors. Conditions also apply to resource
exploitation of this nature. However, the fact that bioprospecting is generally seen as an
activity that has a modest ecological footprint should be borne in mind when searching for
regulatory options.
3. Current discussions and approaches to ABS
In this chapter, approaches to ABS and bioprospecting that are made in different
international organisations and fora will be briefly surveyed. The objective is not to
describe these comprehensively, but to capture regulatory options that exist or are being
discussed in on-going processes. This creates a basis for later outlining options for
regulating the question of rights, of access to high seas bioprospecting and of benefit-
sharing.
3.1. Methodology
The selected organisations and fora are the CBD, the FAO, the Antarctic Treaty System
and the United Nations Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working group to study issues
relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas
beyond national jurisdiction. These four are chosen because issues of bioprospecting or
ABS have been regulated under these conventions or organisations or they are being
discussed in these fora. They all are or have the potential to be creators of norms that may
be relevant to the question of regulatory options for high seas ABS. This choice means that
discussions taking place in other fora, such as the WIPO or the WTO, will not be discussed
further in this thesis.
When exploring on-going discussions of high seas regulation or ABS issues, it is important
to note that these discussions are not reflected in any treaty text, customary law or general
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principles. The method employed here will to study certain existing treaty obligations and
to further perform a desktop study of official meeting reports and documents in order to
discern outputs from these fora. It is important to note that such documents are legally non-
binding. 255 Furthermore, official meeting reports do not necessarily comprehensively
reflect the discussions that take place. Reports may sometimes be consensus based
summaries and thus not fully represent the views of parties. This methodological challenge
will be partially amended by augmenting the analysis with academic literature, where this
is available. On one account, recourse will also be had to personal communication where
the information sought is not available in the official meeting reports. The content of this
information, however, is widely known to participants in that forum.
3.2. CBD and the Nagoya Protocol
3.2.1. CBD and the sea
The Convention on Biological Diversity establishes standards for conduct towards
components of biodiversity. 256 It introduces what has been labelled “the grand global
bargain” by striking a balance between conservation of biodiversity, its sustainable use and
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits that arise from using genetic resources.257 In the
CBD, sovereign rights over genetic material within state jurisdiction are conferred to that
state.258 Provisions and measures to be taken for the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity are found in articles 6 to 14, such as the monitoring of biodiversity, measures
for in situ and ex situ conservation, and impact assessments.
The CBD makes no distinction between marine, terrestrial or other components of
biodiversity. Biodiversity is defined as the “variability among all living organisms from all
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the
255 Compare ICJ Statute, article 38.
256 See Kiss and Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law, 2007, pp. 178-182; Sands, Principles of
International Environmental Law, 2003, pp. 515-523.
257 See CBD, article 1.
258 Ibid., article 3.
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ecological complexes of which they are part”.259 Article 22 regulates the relationship to the
law of the sea; the CBD shall be implemented “with respect to the marine environment
consistently with the rights and obligations under the law of the sea”.260 In relation to the
high seas, article 4 is a key provision, stating that the CBD obligations apply to activities
and processes that are carried out under the jurisdiction or control of a state, “within the
area of national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”, thus including
the high seas.261 For bioprospecting in the high seas a number of the measures to be taken
for the conservation of biodiversity can thus be relevant for bioprospectors flying the flag
of a state signatory to the CBD.262 In this respect, CBD provisions has the potential to
complement the legal framework for high seas bioprospecting.
As stated above, the concept of ABS stems from the CBD, though redistributive principles
are clearly present within earlier instruments, such as UNCLOS. The CBD sets forth a
bilateral or contractual approach to ABS:263 as a quid pro quo for access to GR, the source
country or provider of GR is (ideally) awarded benefits, be they monetary or non-monetary,
by the user. Article 15 of the Convention provides that access shall happen on “mutually
agreed terms” and subjected to the “prior informed consent” of the providing party.264
Parties shall “take legislative, administrative or policy measures” with the aim of sharing
“in a fair and equitable way […] the benefits arising from the commercial and other
utilization of genetic resources” with the providing party.265 Early on, it became clear that
the benefit-sharing provisions were too general to provide an effective regime for ABS and
very few user countries had taken the substantive legislative measures.266
As concerns the high seas, no party has sovereign rights over these resources, and article 15
thus has no direct consequences in terms of mandatory benefit-sharing for utilisation of GR
259 Ibid., article 2.
260 Ibid., article 22(2).
261 Ibid., article 4(b). See also article 5.
262 Arico and Salpin, Bioprospecting of Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed, 2005, p. 38.
263 Bilateral is understood as an agreement between two state parties. The reference to a contractual approach
refers to the common situation where one of the parties to an ABS agreement is not a state.
264 CBD, article 15(4)(5). See also article 19(2).
265 Ibid., article 15(7).
266 Koester, "Nagoya-protokollen om Genetiske Ressourcer", 2011, p. 107.
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carried out under state jurisdiction and control in ABNJ.267 The Conference of the Parties
(COP) to the CBD has engaged in discussions on the relationship of the Convention to
ABNJ on several occasions. Regarding conservation of biodiversity in these areas, the COP
has agreed that there is an urgent need for international cooperation and action to improve
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.268 As
regards the question of benefit-sharing for ABNJ, the question arose under negotiations for
the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention.
3.2.2. The Nagoya Protocol article 10
The Nagoya Protocol (NP) was adopted in October 2010, but is not yet in force.269 It
represents an effort in a series of actions by the COP to more effectively achieve the great
global bargain foreseen by the Convention. The Protocol offers new solutions for the
realisation of the third objective of the CBD, namely the access to, and fair and equitable
sharing of, the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources. 270 The
jurisdictional scope of the Protocol is the same as under the Convention, as pertains to
genetic resources.271 In discussions leading up to COP 10 in Nagoya and during the COP,
African delegations presented the view that many ABS problems could only be resolved
through multilateral solutions, and consequently suggested establishing a global financial
mechanism for cases that do not easily fit into the otherwise predominantly bilateral or
contractual ABS approach.272 An illustration of these cases was noted in a non-paper,
which is included in part as annex to this thesis. Among these cases were GR from the high
267 CBD, article 4(2).
268 COP7, Decision VII/5: Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity, CBD, 2004, paragraph 34. In later COP
decisions, the central role of the UN General Assembly for conservation in ABNJ has been emphasised,
see COP10, Decision X/29: Marine and Coastal Biodiversity, CBD, 2010, paragraph 21.
269 It will enter into force 90 days after deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification. In May 2012, there
were 92 signatories to the protocol and four ratifications.
270 CBD, article 1. On benefit-sharing provisions under the NP, see Koester, "Nagoya-protokollen om
Genetiske Ressourcer", 2011, pp. 111-113; Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of
Genetic Resources: An Analysis, 2011, p. 27. See also generally, Billé, et al., La CdP de Nagoya: un
succès pour la gouvernance mondiale de la biodiversité, 2010; Jardin and Chiarolla, "Implications of the
Nagoya Protocol", 2011.
271 NP, article 3.
272 Pierre du Plessis, African Proposal to MLS, 11 October 2011. Most of the ABNJ arguments of the African
Group were made verbally.
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seas. Other parties were highly reluctant.273 African negotiators later indicated that the
proposals for the Protocol to apply to pre-CBD material and to ABNJ could be dropped in
exchange for a global mechanism for the sharing of benefits from the use of such
material.274 Yet disagreement persisted and the conflict later resulted in article 10 of the
Protocol as part of a compromise package. The provision was proposed at the last minute
by the Japanese hosts and the article has not been subject to negotiations.275 Contrasting the
otherwise contractual approach to ABS of the CBD and NP, article 10 states that parties
“shall consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing
mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization
of genetic resources […] that occur in transboundary situations for which it is not possible
to grant or obtain prior informed consent”. Article 10 thus provides no immediate binding
obligations on the parties, apart from an obligation to “consider” a question.
The question is whether the provision as it now stands may cover a mechanism applicable
to bioprospecting in the high seas. Bioprospecting means utilisation of GR in the sense that
the resources are used or developed to achieve a commercial objective. Whether high seas
bioprospecting is a “transboundary situation” is more open for different interpretations. The
term “transboundary” can indicate something crossing a line of jurisdiction, from one state
to another. “Transboundary” may also refer to something, GR in this case, that is present
on several sides of a boundary. As the term “boundary” is used in UNCLOS it would
appear to relate to lines of jurisdiction between opposite of adjacent states, and not
necessarily to a delimitation concerning the high seas.276 Against this, it can be contended
that it is not illogical to classify the line marking the outer limit of an EEZ or contiguous
zone as a boundary, even though the line is drawn between this zone and the high seas, and
not another state. The context in which article 10 was adopted, as a result of the African
273 Jungcurt, et al., Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 19 July 2010.
274 Buck and Hamilton, "The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity", 2011, p. 59.
275 See e.g. Jungcurt, et al., Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 1 November 2010.
276 UNCLOS, article 298(1)(a)(i), referring to articles 15, 74 and 83.
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position, might be an argument for this being a transboundary situation. There is as of yet
no clear answer to which of these interpretations will prevail.
Furthermore, the question is whether high seas bioprospecting constitutes utilisation “for
which it is not possible to obtain prior informed consent”. Prior informed consent, as the
term is encountered, though not defined, in the CBD article 15, is one of the pillars of the
ABS system of the CBD and the NP. It reflects the geographical scope of the CBD, where
there is indeed a providing party that can give such consent prior to conceding access to
GR under its jurisdiction. The impossibility of obtaining consent is a wide formulation, and
may include impossibility due to temporal, jurisdictional or other preventing
circumstances.277 As pertains to the high seas, there is no providing entity or authority that
might grant consent. Prior informed consent would thus be impossible to obtain for
utilisation of GR in the high seas. Yet access to GR in the high seas is, as seen in chapter 2,
open under the law of the sea. From an UNCLOS perspective, it can be remarked that
impossibility of obtaining consent to activities that do not require consent, seems a peculiar
logical construction. If impossibility of obtaining prior informed consent to access to high
seas GR would constitute a rationale for a multilateral system under the CBD, renewed
considerations on the legal status of MSR and the relationship between the CBD and
UNCLOS would be called for.278
Further discussion on the scope and meaning of article 10 has not yet taken place in official
CBD fora. An Intergovernmental Committee is scheduled to consider the need for and
modalities of such a mechanism in July 2012. 279 It does seem fair to assume that
interpretations of the scope article 10 may benefit from the Protocol entering into force and
the resolution of other pressing issues concerning the functionality of the NP in areas under
national jurisdiction. When searching for the exact meaning of article 10, it must also be
added that an obligation to “consider” something is a vague and soft obligation. Article 10
277 Tvedt, A Report from the First Reflection Meeting on the Global Multilateral Benefit-sharing Mechanism,
2011, p. 12.
278 See NP, article 3.
279 Protocol, Annotated Provisional Agenda, Convention on Biological Diversity, 24 February 2012
(UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/1/Add.1/Rev.1), p. 5.
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might just be one of the provisions that make the Protocol merit the characterisation given
by some parties as a “masterpiece in creative ambiguity”.280 When discussions on article 10
take place, the direction that they take will probably be of greater importance to a
multilateral scenario for ABNJ than attempts at deciphering the provision itself.
The Protocol and the debate surrounding it show, however, that creating a multilateral
benefit-sharing mechanism for bioprospecting in the high seas is an option that is favoured
by some, and which is currently up for discussion.
3.3. ABS approaches under the FAO
Agrobiodiversity is a sub-category of biodiversity and comprises aquatic biodiversity.281
Whereas conservation and benefit-sharing under the CBD is regulated irrespective of the
sector or objective of use, the focus now shifts to biological material used directly or
indirectly for food. This section seeks to describe some of the approaches to ABS under the
auspices of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO).
3.3.1. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)
was adopted in 2001 at the 31st meeting of the FAO Conference and came into force in
2004. The scope of the treaty Treaty is only to a limited extent relevant to bioprospecting,
as plant breeding and research on known ex situ resources are the main users of GR
covered by the treaty. Yet, the multilateral system it establishes may provide experiences
relevant for a multilateral approach to high seas ABS.
280 Jungcurt, et al., Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 1 November 2010.
281 Santilli, Agrobiodiversity and the Law: Regulating Genetic Resources, Food Security and Cultural
Diversity, 2012, pp. 1-12.
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Its objectives are consistent with those of the CBD, as the treaty seeks the conservation and
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and the fair and
equitable sharing of benefits that arise from this use, “in harmony with” the CBD.282 States
detain sovereign jurisdiction over plant GR for food and agriculture under the ITPGRFA.283
How ABS is envisaged differs in the two conventions. Part IV of the Treaty sets forth a
multilateral system that establishes a common pool for plant genetic resources. The
resources that enter the pool are limited to 35 food crops and 29 forage plants, specified in
Annex I to the Treaty, which are under the control of parties and in the public domain.284
This excludes GR from the high seas. The GR held in the mechanism are principally those
GR listed in Annex 1 that are held in the ex situ collections of the research centres of the
Consultative Group of the International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).285 The CGIAR is
an association regrouping a network of 15 research centres, dedicated to research on
agriculture and food production.286
3.3.2. Lessons learned from the ITPGRFA on ABS
In article 12, the ITPGRFA sets forth a system of facilitated access to the common pool for
natural and legal persons under the jurisdiction of the parties. Facilitated access can in itself
be considered a form of benefit-sharing. Access is given solely for utilisation and
conservation for “research, breeding and training for food and agriculture, provided that
such purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-food/feed related
industrial uses”.287 Of course, this restriction on allowed uses of the information reflects the
material scope of the Treaty to plant GR for food and agriculture. Yet, this approach to
multilateralism is not easily transferable to a bioprospecting context characterised by the
282 ITPGRFA, article 1(1.1).
283 Ibid., article 10.
284 Ibid., article 11.2.
285 Ibid., article 11.5. See Chiarolla and Jungcurt, Outstanding Issues on Access and Benefit Sharing under the
Multilateral System of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,
2011, p. 13.
286 On the history and functioning of the CGIAR, see Fowler and Mooney, Shattering: Food, Policies and the
Loss of Genetic Diversity, 1990, pp. 150-151; FAO, The State of the World's Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture, 1997, p. 253; Brahy and Louafi, The Role of the Research Sector in ABS
Governance, 2007, pp. 10-12.
287 ITPGRFA, article 12(3)(a).
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many and diversified final uses of GR. This shows that the ITPGRFA is not a model for
high seas ABS that can be transposed to a high seas setting without important
modifications.
Patents on products incorporating material in the common pool can be sought, but by the
standard material transfer agreement signed to access the system, parties agree that they
shall not seek rights that limit facilitated access to this material.288
The standard material transfer agreements must also include a requirement to recipients
who commercialise a new product, to make a payment to the benefit-sharing mechanism.289
This feature can theoretically be transposed to a high seas setting. The main idea is that of
giving something back as a quid pro quo for the right to examine something that would
otherwise not be available. If biological material or other knowledge resulting from
bioprospecting is held in a common pool, the right of access can be linked with a duty to
give something back if the accession results in commercial success. Drankier et alii point
out that there is no start or end date to the benefit-sharing obligations, which has made
some parties cautious to the agreement.290 They stress that that this should be taken into
account for ABS solutions in ABNJ.291
To date, no mandatory payments have been made under the ITPGRFA. 292 A possible
explanation is that it takes years to develop a stable plant variety, and that the system will
not produce results for some time to come.293 A less optimistic prediction would be that
even in a few years, payments to the benefit-sharing mechanism would still not be a
widespread phenomenon. At least so far, the IPGRFA cannot provide an example of
288 See Drankier, et al., "Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Access and
Benefit-Sharing", 2012, p. 380 for a review of other conditions in the standard material transfer agreement.
289 ITPGRFA, article 13.2(d)(ii).
290 Drankier, et al., "Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction", 2012, p. 381.
291 Ibid., p. 385.
292 Governing Body, Reviews and Assessments under the Multilateral System and of the Implementation and
Operation of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement, The International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2011 (IT/GB-4/11/13), paragraph 42.
293 Lightbourne, "The FAO Multilateral System for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: Better
than Bilateralism?", 2009, p. 470.
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successful monetary benefit-sharing that can be applied without further scrutiny to the high
seas.
3.4. Bioprospecting discussions in the ATCM
Antarctica is the area south of 60 degrees South latitude, including the ice shelves,
excluding the seas beyond these ice shelves.294 The main governing mechanism is the
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and the fundamental treaty therein is the Antarctic Treaty.
Several bodies under the ATS discuss and work on issues of bioprospecting, such as
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and the Committee for Environmental
Protection. In the following, discussions under the executive body, the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting (ATCM), will be discussed.
3.4.1. Bioprospecting under ATS
Since it was first discussed by the ATCM in 2002, the issue of bioprospecting in the
Antarctic has received increasing attention from state parties. 295 No ATS instrument
specifically addresses bioprospecting, yet high expectations are sometimes expressed as to
what the ATCM might accomplish in terms of bioprospecting policies.296 The legal and
institutional framework of the ATS presents certain characteristics that are absent in other
instruments governing areas unpopulated by humans. First of all, compared to the
multitude of parties to the UNCLOS, ATS is something of a microcosm. Compared to the
162 parties to UNCLOS, there are 28 consultative parties with the right to participate in
decision-making under ATCM. Theoretically, there could be a possibility that interests
converge to a greater degree and that reaching a common ground on bioprospecting could
be less challenging. More significantly, the Antarctic Treaty reflects the unique balance
struck on the different claims of sovereignty to Antarctic areas.297 The Treaty builds upon
294 Antarctic Treaty [Antarctic Treaty], 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 72, article VI.
295 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Final Report of the Twenty-Fifth Antactic Treaty
Consulative Meeting, 25th ATCM, 2002, paragraph 58.
296 See Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Biological Prospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area
– Scoping for a Regulatory Framework (Working paper submitted by The Netherlands, Belgium and
France), 30th ATCM, 2007 (WP36, Agenda Item 17), paragraph 1.
297 Vidas, "The Antarctic Treaty System in the International Community: An Overview", 1996, p. 37.
66
freedom of scientific research, 298 exchange of scientific results 299 and international
cooperation300 as fundamental principles. The provisions of the Madrid Protocol further
strengthen the legal protection of Antarctic environment. 301 The Protocol comprises
modern principles of environmental law, such as the ecosystem approach302 and elaborates
requirements of prior impact assessments.303 Bioprospecting is thus subject to prior impact
assessments.304
Of particular interest when comparing the legal regimes of UNCLOS and ATS, is the
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).305
This Convention sets down as fundamental principle for harvest of all marine living
resources in Antarctica the prevention of populations decrease, maintenance of ecological
relationships between “harvested dependent and related populations”, and the prevention of
changes in marine ecosystems that cannot be reversed during a period of two to three
decades. 306 The Convention establishes a Commission that gives effect to these three
principles of conservation.307 Also noteworthy is the geographical scope of the CCAMLR.
In contrast to the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol, it applies not only to the areas
south of 60 degrees South latitude, but also the segment between that latitude and the
“Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem”.308 This is a
considerable geographical expansion. Bioprospecting done by CCAMLR parties in parts of
the sea that would otherwise be governed by the regime of the high seas, is hence subject to
the provisions of this treaty and the authority of the Commission.
298 Antarctic Treaty, preamble, paragraphs 2 and 3; articles III and VII.
299 Ibid., article III(1)(c).
300 Ibid., article II.
301 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty [Madrid Protocol], 4 October 1991. On the
applicability of the Protocol to microorganisms, see Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM),
Concepts, Terms and Definitions, including a Comparative Analysis (Information paper by Sweden,
Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain), 32nd ATCM, 2009 (IP70, Agenda Item 17), p. 6.
302 Madrid Protocol, article 3(1).
303 Ibid., article 8, which is further outlined in Annex I to the Protocol.
304 Ibid., Annex I, article 1. See also Annex II, article 3.
305 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources [CCAMLR], 20 May 1980, 1329
UNTS 48.
306 Ibid., article II(3)
307 Ibid., art IX.
308 Ibid., article I(1).
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On the one hand, the ATS framework can be seen as an ideal starting point for discussions
of bioprospecting, since agreement has already been reached on elements that are key to
developing bioprospecting policies. On the other hand, the situation can also be seen as one
so comprehensively regulating scientific and environmental issues that further regulation is
superfluous.309
These instruments make bioprospecting in Antarctica subject to considerably stricter
conditions than for the high seas under UNCLOS. Nonetheless, there are several common
denominators that make the comparison between the two regimes relevant. First,
bioprospecting is on-going: currently 185 bioprospecting activities in Antarctica conducted
or sponsored by 26 countries are registered with the Antarctica bioprospector database.310
Patents are also being filed and have been granted, just as in the case of the high seas.311
The real extent of Antarctic bioprospecting is not known, similarly to the situation in the
high seas. Second, the issue of distinguishing pure research from applied research is also
present in both contexts. Legal uncertainty could also be a disincentive to bioprospecting in
both areas: in a report from the United Nations University, industry representatives express
that uncertainty regarding the use of their findings and ownership of samples inhibits
bioprospecting investments in the Antarctic. 312 Their partners, the scientists, report of
inability to work with industry due to the absence of clear protocols on the exchange of
information arising from commercial activities.313 These are considerations worth keeping
in mind when considering regulatory options for bioprospecting in the high seas.
309 This gap of opinions among parties is reflected e. g. in a working paper for ATCM XXXIII in 2010, see
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Report of the ATCM Intersessional Contact Group to
Examine the Issue of Bioprospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area (Working paper submitted by the
Netherlands), 33rd ATCM, 2010 (WP13, Agenda Item 17), paragraph 4.
310 United Nations University. Bioprospecting Information Resource: Antarctic [online database].
<www.bioprospector.org/bioprospector/antarctica/home.action>.
311 Eighteen companies were known to have applied for Antarctic-based patents in 2003, see Lohan and
Johnston, Bioprospecting in Antarctica, 2005, p. 10.
312 Ibid. p. 13.
313 Ibid.
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It is against this backdrop of a modern environmental regulation coming up against the
requirements of bio-science in a commercial era, that the ATCM now discusses the
possibility of regulating the activity of bioprospecting specifically.
3.4.2. ATCM policy discussions
In 2002, parties to the ATCM recognised bioprospecting as a “very important matter” that
raised “legal and political issues, as well as environmental issues”.314 Three years later,
parties recommended that governments “keep under review the question of biological
prospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area”.315 Member states have repeatedly been invited to
share information with the ATCM on bioprospecting activities undertaken by their
nationals. 316 In 2011, several parties asserted that states should focus attention on
bioprospecting in Antarctica and that, given developments in the CBD and the UN General
Assembly, “there was now a sense of urgency on the issue”.317
As a common ground of consensus parties concur that the ATS is the “appropriate
framework for managing the collection of biological material in the Antarctic Treaty area
and for considering its use”318 and to keep the issue on the agenda and under “active
consideration within the Antarctic Treaty system”.319 In 2011, broad support was expressed
for the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD not applying to Antarctic bioprospecting.320
314 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Final Report of the Twenty-Fifth Antactic Treaty
Consulative Meeting, 2002, paragraph 68.
315 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Final Report of the Twenty-Eighth Antarctic Treaty
Consulative Meeting, 28th ATCM, 2005, Resolution 7, p. 435.
316 See e.g. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Argentine Activities of Bioprospecting and
Bioremediation in Antarctica (Information Paper by Argentina), 29th ATCM, 2006 (IP112, Agenda Item
18).
317 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Final Report of the Thirty-fourth Antarctic Treaty
Consultive Meeting, 34th ATCM, 2011, paragraph 83.
318 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Final Report of the Thirty-Second Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting, 32nd ATCM, 2009, Resolution 9, p. 289.
319 Ibid.
320 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Final Report of the Thirty-fourth Antarctic Treaty
Consultive Meeting, 2011, paragraph 420.
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No party appears to be of the view that access to biological material for bioprospecting
should be restricted.321 Opinions diverge as to the need for benefit-sharing, other than that
already resulting from the obligation to share research results.322 Some argue that there is
no reason why benefits from the commercialisation of biological material should be treated
differently than other Antarctic activities that are not subject to benefit-sharing.323 Against
this, others argue that when patents are established, the research is no longer freely
available.324 There is a parallel here with the difficulties arising under UNCLOS discussed
above. Several suggestions have been put forth by parties advocating further benefit-
sharing policies. Among the more radical are those made by the Netherlands to include
both in situ and ex situ material in a multilateral system: ex situ material would remain in
the system after its collection, but rights to possess and use material would automatically
arise from the reporting of the collection to the competent authority.325 When patents are
established to research results from material in the system, benefits would be required to be
shared to promote the objectives of the treaty, in particular scientific investigation.326 A
similar approach could be argued for the high seas.327 Other proposals, such as sharing a
percentage of benefits with the party under whose jurisdiction the research takes place,328
are not so easily transferable. Discussions are also confronted with diverging opinions on
whether the ATS should cover subsequent elements of product development. Some states
argue that subsequent product development actions cannot easily fall within the scope of
321 See e.g. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Report of the ATCM Intersessional Contact
Group to Examine the Issue of Bioprospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area (Working paper submitted by
the Netherlands), 2010 (WP13, Agenda Item 17), paragraph 11.
322 Antarctic Treaty, article III(1)(c).
323 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Final Report of the Thirty-Second Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting, 2009, paragraph 312.
324 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Report of the ATCM Intersessional Contact Group to
Examine the Issue of Bioprospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area (Working paper submitted by the
Netherlands), 2010 (WP13, Agenda Item 17), paragraph 14.
325 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Principles for the Access to and Use of Biological
Material in the Antarctic Treaty Area (Working paper submitted by the Netherlands), 33rd ATCM, 2010
(WP24, Agenda Item 17), paragraphs 3 and 8.
326 Ibid., paragraph 11.
327 A somewhat similar proposal will be discussed below, see section 4.3.2.
328 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Report of the ATCM Intersessional Contact Group to
Examine the Issue of Bioprospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area (Working paper submitted by the
Netherlands), 2010 (WP13, Agenda Item 17), paragraph 14.
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the Treaty, except for the overarching environmental principles of the Protocol.329 Indeed,
practical challenges may arise in regulating and tracking Antarctic biological material in
the years following sampling. Legally, though, there are no barriers to extending the scope
of the treaty to subsequent uses by nationals to signatory states, as an expression of state
sovereignty.
To conclude, it seems unlikely that benefit-sharing in a multilateral system or trust is right
around the corner for Antarctic bioprospecting, given the resistance of some parties. This
does not exclude progress on strengthening the sharing of research results or other non-
monetary forms of benefit-sharing. If there is to be an ATS instrument that specifically
addresses the issue of bioprospecting, it will probably reflect the jurisdictional
particularities of Antarctica, the substantial body of environmental regulation in place and
the important position awarded to scientific research. A possible Antarctic regulatory
scenario could therefore not be adapted to the high seas without further scrutiny. A
common regime for benefit-sharing in these areas is also hard to imagine, unless it is based
entirely on voluntary mechanisms.
3.5. UN General Assembly and the Working Group
Apart from what might follow from NP article 10, none of the organisations and fora seen
above directly address bioprospecting in the high seas. It is now time to turn to the forum in
which the question has been addressed most specifically.
3.5.1. Mandate and potential
In 2004, the United Nations General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Open-ended
Informal Working group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of
marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction,330 hereinafter the Working
329 Ibid., paragraph 7.
330 United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2004 (A/RES/59/24), paragraph 73.
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Group.331
Present at the Working Group meetings are chiefly representatives from states, but also
from intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations. Their mandate
is to “examine the scientific, technical, economic, legal, environmental, socio-economic
and other aspects” of conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in ABNJ.332
Bioprospecting is but one of many issues discussed in the Working Group, but it remains
one of the more controversial.333 The Working Group shall indicate options to promote
cooperation and coordination “for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction”.334 It is therefore a forum that has the
potential to be a creator of norms for bioprospecting in the high seas. In the mere
establishment of the discussion forum, some see an evident preparing of ground for
regimes that regulate the exploitation of genetic resources in ABNJ.335
As common ground, delegations value the conservation of marine biological material and
the importance of scientific research.336 Proposals put forth to protect the marine genetic
resources in ABNJ include environmental impact assessments and marine protected areas
(MPAs), though support is not unanimous.337
331 Another UN forum where marine GR in ABNJ have been discussed, but on a relatively general level is the
United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, see e.g.
Broggiato, "Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction", 2011, p. 40.
332 United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2004 (A/RES/59/24),
paragraph 73(a)(b).
333 The term bioprospecting is not frequently employed, and reports tend to use the term “exploitation of GR”.
334 United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2004 (A/RES/59/24), paragraph 73(d).
335 Treves, "Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction",
2010, p. 17.
336 See e.g. Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-
Chaipersons of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the
Conservation of Marine Biological Diversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction to the President of the
General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly, 2008 (A/63/79), paragraphs 6 and 10.
337 See e.g. Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter Dated 30 June 2011, 2011 (A/66/119),
paragraph 1.
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3.5.2. Discussions on a future regime for biological material in ABNJ
Difficulties arise as to bioprospecting and the legal status of marine biological material.
The only consensus regarding this issue appears to be the need to improve knowledge on
existing activities, their costs and implications for the marine environment. 338 The
dichotomy of the common heritage of mankind versus high seas freedom, as the relevant
regime for biological material of the seabed, is clearly reflected throughout the five
meetings held to date. Chief arguments are that General Assembly Resolution 2749339 and
UNCLOS Part XI are part of customary law, and that the legal regime applicable is defined
not by the nature of the resource but the zone in which it is situated.340 Some of the
representatives appear to argue that the common heritage regime should apply to ABNJ in
general.341 They call for new approaches to regulate ABS regarding these resources, and
some suggest broadening the mandate of ISA in this respect.342 From the meetings held to
date, this seems to be one of the most reiterated regulatory options put forth. Yet it is a
politically problematic one. One commentator labels parties advocating the common
heritage approach to seabed GR as “fundamentalists”.343 Though this is an overstatement, it
is clear that a discussion devoted to defending or denying the applicability of the common
heritage regime is not likely to yield regulatory options. The regime of the Area has been
subject to great controversy for a number of years, and is one of the reasons why the United
States has not yet ratified UNCLOS. 344 Judging from reports from the 2012 meeting,
controversy persists.345 Also, the common heritage regime is tailored for mineral resource
338 Broggiato, "Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction", 2008, p.185.
339 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 1970 (A/RES/25/2749).
340 See e.g. Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter Dated 16 March from the Co-Chairpersons
of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, United
Nations General Assembly, 2010, paragraph 71.
341 See e.g. Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal
Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological
Biodiversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, United Nations General Assembly, 2006,
paragraph 71.
342 Ibid.
343 Leary, "International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea", 2009, p. 366.
344 Browne, "The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S. Policy", 2007, p. 195.
345 Chiarolla, et al., Marine Biodiversity Working Group Highlights: Tuesday, 8 May 2012, 9 May 2012.
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exploitation and does not answer questions of how benefit-sharing is to be done when
inventions are patent protected.346
As middle ground between the common heritage most fervent objectors and defenders, the
EU suggested in 2008 taking the ITPGRFA multilateral mechanism as a reference point for
the discussions.347 The proposal was welcomed by most parties, and opposed only by the
United States and South Africa.348 In subsequent meetings, reference was made to the
ITPGRFA, though it seems that this has not led to concrete policy proposals.349 This is
perhaps not so surprising, given that the multilateral mechanism has yet to fulfil its
intended benefit-sharing potential.
Reference has also been made to the International Seabed Authority Endowment Fund.350
The fund is currently financed by donations, and enables scientists from developing
countries to participate in MSR undertaken in the Area.351 Severed from any ties to the
ISA, it is a model that can be considered for the high seas. Benefits shared would then take
the form of capacity building, more specifically training of personnel, cooperation in MSR,
and possibly strengthening the sharing of research results.
Proposals have also been put forth to further the sharing of research results. For instance, it
has been suggested that a network of ocean observatories could be created, or knowledge
could be systemised and made easily accessible through standardised data management
systems.352 Systemisation and sharing knowledge were later proposed as taking the form of
346 Leary, "International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea", 2009, p. 366.
347 Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter dated 15 May 2008, 2008 (A/63/79), paragraph 38;
Broggiato, "Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction", 2008, p. 186.
348 Broggiato, "Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction", 2008, p. 186.
349 Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter Dated 30 June 2011, 2011 (A/66/119),
paragraph 48.
350 Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working
Group, 2006, paragraph 11; Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter dated 15 May 2008,
2008 (A/63/79), paragraph 35.
351 See generally International Seabed Authority, Endowment Fund, 2012, <www.isa.org.jm/en/efund/>.
352 Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working
Group, 2006, paragraph 64.
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improving the GRAMED database,353 which is a database that currently holds a limited
amount of information on certain activities in the sea.354 Benefit-sharing in such a scenario
would take the form of non-monetary benefits. It could provide for increased sharing of
research results and thus a more effective implementation of UNCLOS article 244.
These proposals are examples of what state representatives view as possible modalities for
benefit-sharing in the high seas. Some representatives, such as the EU, argue for creating
an implementation agreement to UNCLOS, comprising also a “practical structure for
ABS”. 355 Others, such as the Russian representative, see no need for creating new
instruments. In this situation, arguments for ABS understandably take a quite general form,
and concrete suggestions on what ABS could look like a rare commodity. Generally,
proposals draw inspiration from other instruments of international law or attempt to build
upon existing voluntary mechanisms. In terms of being a creator of new ideas and norms
for high seas ABS, the Working Group has perhaps not yet fully realised its potential.
3.6. Closing remarks on current discussions and approaches to ABS
The existing models and more or less loosely formulated suggestions on ABS can be
grouped as either contractual, bi-lateral or multilateral, voluntary or mandatory. Emphasis
can be put on fairness and equity, the conservation of biodiversity, the furthering of
scientific knowledge, or various degrees of combination of these objectives. The
discussions above show that some states are eager to apply the concept of ABS to new
geographical areas and new biological material. Yet these states are confronted not only
with the view held by some that ABS simply is a bad idea, but also with the difficulty of
conceiving a system that would work. So far, neither the CBD nor the ITPGRFA can
provide examples of truly successful legal regimes for benefit-sharing. A possible
conclusion is that this gives a bleak outlook for ABS in general, including ABS for the high
353 See generally UNEP, Global and Regional Marine Assessment Database, 2008, <www.unep-wcmc-
apps.org/GRAMED/index.cfm>
354 Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter Dated 16 March, 2010, paragraph 80.
355 Chiarolla, et al., Summary of the Fifth Meeting of the Working Group on Marine Biodiversity Beyond
Areas of National Jurisdiction, 14 May 2012.
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seas. Yet each of the organisations and treaties discussed above are naturally influenced by
the particularities of either the geographical scope of the instruments or the resources
regulated. As the discussions of the Working Group show, the high seas policies also have
to face the jurisdictional particularities and the diverging opinions on the law that currently
applies to bioprospecting. Mindful of this situation, and of various policy proposals for
bioprospecting and ABS, the discussion now turns to outlining regulatory options for ABS
in the high seas.
4. Considerations on regulatory options
4.1. Methodology and criteria for outlining regulatory options
The aim of this chapter is to discuss de lege ferenda regulatory approaches to
bioprospecting in the high seas with a particular view to ABS. Rather than concluding on
preferred solutions, the aim is to highlight qualities and drawbacks attached to the various
alternatives.
The starting point from which policies are proposed is that of the current situation outlined
above. Accordingly, a premise for the discussions is that existing rights and obligations
under international law must be respected. Building upon existing rights and obligations is
a well-known approach and a necessary way to address the question of future policies.356
Existing rights and obligations, especially under UNCLOS and the TRIPS Agreement, are
cornerstones on which any further high seas ABS regulation would have to build.
In order to evaluate different options, a set of criteria is proposed here. This more easily
enables considerations of the advantages and drawbacks of different options. Four criteria
are chosen for the assessment of regulatory options: the potential of a policy to spur
356 In the context of UNCLOS, the Implementation Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks may serve as a noteworthy example.
Concerning the CBD, the NP provides an example of this approach.
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innovation, the potential to promote conservation, the potential to ensure sustainable use of
marine biodiversity and whether a policy presents as a fair option. What is meant by these
objectives and why they are pertinent criteria in this setting will now be elaborated upon.
The first criterion retained is that of the potential of a regulation to spur innovation. This is
understood here as the potential to advance scientific knowledge in a manner that is
beneficial to humanity and human activities. As such, it may just as well be purely
scientific innovation that furthers knowledge of the ocean, as it may be applications of
biological diversity that lead to commercial gain and new products available on the market.
A major source of scepticism towards ABS in general, voiced by some developed states, is
that “fair and equitable sharing” means putting unnecessary strain on the creators of
innovation, i.e. industry and business, thus constituting a disincentive to innovate. 357
Though not a new argument, it should be seen in relation to the economic downturn in
recent years. The biotechnology industry is currently undergoing difficult times. Despite
the financial crisis of 2008, the revenue growth of global biotech industry was upheld in the
following years. However, costs were cut by reducing investments in R&D: investment in
biotechnology in the United States, Europe, Canada and Australia fell by 21 per cent in
2009.358 In an industry where R&D is the fundamental ingredient for the innovation wanted
by all parties, avoiding unnecessary strain on the creators of innovation is a key task. If
high seas policies are seen as more burdensome than those applying to the EEZ, the latter
jurisdictional zone may prove a preferred option for bioprospectors. In this perspective,
policy makers have a choice of either designing a system that provides innovation
incentives for bioprospecting in the high seas, or agreeing upon a geographically vast
regime that incorporates the EEZ, the Area and maybe even the continental shelf. This
latter option seems to be unlikely, judging from on-going discussions. ABS policies should
not reduce incentives of researching parties to conduct bioprospecting. Not only would
there be a greater chance of convincing the parties who benefit from the current situation,
but other challenges such as flag state shopping or even “jurisdictional zone” shopping
357 Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group, Letter Dated 30 June 2011, 2011 (A/66/119), paragraph 6.
358 Giovannetti, et al., Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report 2011, 2011, p. 37. Recovering
somewhat in 2010, expenditures grew by 2 per cent in the same regions.
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could be reduced. Addressing these concerns and evaluating the capacity of regulatory
options to spur innovation, as opposed to limiting it, is thus a highly pertinent objective.
Conservation, the second criterion, it is here understood as both in situ and ex situ
conservation of biodiversity. As defined in the CBD article 2, in situ conservation is “the
conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of
viable populations of species in their natural surroundings […]”.359 Ex situ conservation is
the “conservation of components of biological diversity outside their natural habitats”.360
Ex situ conservation may for instance be keeping reproductive material in collections as a
resource for research, or for reintroduction into the wild of endangered species. It should be
reiterated here that CBD does not apply to ABNJ,361 and it is far from obvious that the
definitions of this Convention would prevail in a setting relating to the law of the sea. Yet,
as the existing body of law relating to conservation in these areas is not associated with
legally binding definitions, those of the CBD may serve as a reference point. Setting
conservation of biodiversity as an objective when proposing regulatory options is pertinent
when one considers the rapid on-going loss of oceanic biodiversity. Biodiversity is in itself,
for instance in the CBD, generally recognised as an intrinsic value,362 notwithstanding the
enormous value it holds for humanity. Considering the potential, or lack of such, of any
regulatory proposal to conserve biodiversity is thus a relevant exercise.
Sustainable use is a sub-notion of sustainable development. A generally accepted definition
of sustainable development is that of the so-called Brundtland Report of 1987, which saw
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. 363 Two key
concepts are reflected; that of a present and future need, and that of limitations imposed by
the current state of technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability to meet
359 CBD, article 2, paragraph 13.
360 Ibid., article 2, paragraph 8.
361 Its provisions apply in relation to each contracting party to areas within national jurisdiction and may only
be extended to ABNJ as a result of flag state jurisdiction. See ibid., article 4(a) and (b).
362 Ibid., preamble, paragraph 2.
363 World Commission on Environment and Development, Report of the World Commission on Environment
and Development: Our Common Future, 1987 (Annex to document A/42/427), part IV, paragraph 1.
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both current and future needs.364 There is disagreement among scholars as to the normative
value of sustainable development as legal norm. 365 The idea of intergenerational
responsibility, however, is well established and has been relied upon as early as 1893 in the
Pacific Fur Seals Arbitration.366 Sustainable use is understood here to be a limitation of the
scope of the concept, from development in general to use of natural resources. For as
Beyerlin and Marauhn point out, sustainable use only gains normative quality if linked with
a specific object of use: 367 the CBD refers to the sustainable use of “biological
resources”.368 Here, the object of use is marine biological material as the resource used in
bioprospecting in the high seas. There is currently a need expressed by science, industry
and others to use high seas biological material. The assumption is that there will also be
such a need in the future. Ensuring the environment’s capacity to serve these needs is thus
of vital concern when outlining and assessing regulatory options. Sustainable use of marine
biodiversity is closely linked to conservation in that their objectives both refer to
environmental protection. But where conservation aims directly at the protection of the
environment, sustainable use refers to the linkage between the need for environmental
protection and human need to utilise nature. The need to utilise nature is also closely linked
with the criterion, set out above, of spurring innovation. In this setting, sustainable use of
marine biodiversity reflects the interconnectivity of conservation as a prerequisite for
innovation through biotechnology.
Fairness refers often to general conceptions of what is just and morally right. On an
international level, the concept of fairness often refers to the general North-South gap in
development. In this case, fairness might, but not necessarily, refer to a gap between
bioprospector and the involuntary bystander. In short, deeming something fair or unfair is
often assumed to be a subjective exercise. Objectives of fairness are already present in
364 Ibid.; Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2003, p. 253.
365 See Beyerlin and Marauhn, International Environmental Law, 2011, pp. 76-82.
366 Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2003, p. 256 citing Moore’s International
Arbitration Awards, 1893, p. 755.
367 Beyerlin and Marauhn, International Environmental Law, 2011, p. 82.
368 CBD, article 10. It further defines sustainable use as “the use of components of biological diversity in a
way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations”, see CBD, article 2,
paragraph 16.
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UNCLOS, and its preamble is a useful indication in this respect. The preamble reflects the
desirability of a legal order promoting “equitable and efficient utilization” of the oceanic
resources.369 As bioprospecting is utilisation of oceanic resources, an objective would be
that this is done in an equitable and efficient manner.370 Equitable utilisation can be an
expression of fairness and suggests an equal level of access to the resources for researchers.
One approach could be to consider this achieved by the current “first come, first served”
situation, which is well in line with the fairness provided by the formal equality of access to
the high seas, defended by Grotius. 371 UNCLOS also provides that this utilisation of
resources shall be “efficient”. This can express a utilitarian form of fairness, i.e. the
fairness in a solution is judged by its potential to produce the maximum amount of goods.
In this thesis, this objective is already present in the criterion of spurring innovation, set
above.
So the question is whether there are other conceptions of fairness that must also be taken
into account. The preamble recognises a just and equitable economic order, which takes
into account the interest of mankind and the “special interests and needs of developing
countries”, be they coastal or landlocked.372 A fair regulation would thus take into account
these special needs and be constructed accordingly. This side of fairness can be further
specified by way of inspiration from a Rawlsian perspective. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
launched the idea of justice as fairness.373 Taking account of the utilitarian perspective, he
used the social contract as a means of expressing how rational and mutually disinterested
parties to the contract in would agree to certain principles of justice. Among these
principles is the distribution of social and economic differences in a society is done so that
the least advantaged parties achieve as the greatest benefits that the circumstances
permit.374 Though Rawls, it seems, did not himself apply his theory to the international
369 UNCLOS, preamble, paragraph 5.
370 On the justice in using GR, see Schroeder and Pogge, "Justice and the Convention on Biological
Diversity", 2009.
371 See above, section 2.2.1.
372 UNCLOS, preamble, paragraph 6.
373 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, 1999
374 Ibid., pp. 62-65.
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scene without modifications,375 this idea will serve as an inspiration when approaching
what is fair when considering alternatives to the current legal regimes on an issue where
benefits are unevenly distributed. To consider the fairness of policies is pertinent as a
criterion in this context because it is a core objective to the concept of benefit-sharing
itself. Concerning marine biological material, fairness has the potential to play an even
greater part than in the CBD: under the CBD sharing the benefits that arise from utilisation
of GR ideally entails a return of said benefits to a national or local entity in a provider
country, thus creating an incentive to safeguard and conserve biodiversity.376 Since there is
no providing or conserving party in the high seas, it can be argued that ABS for the high
seas has the potential to fulfil a function that is more redistributive of means and know-
how, than it is conservationist. It should be added that any redistributed benefits might in
turn be used for conservation purposes, so that a link may be established between fairness
and conservation. Fairness is also related to the ability of a regulation to spur innovation
because if objectives of fairness deter innovation, all stakeholders will be deprived of the
benefits. A key task is therefore to search for options where objectives of fairness and new
innovation conflict as little as possible.
Having set the potential for new innovation, conservation, sustainable use and fairness as
the four criteria for the subsequent discussion, the next section will address challenges that
are common to all ABS scenarios.
4.2. Initial remarks on challenges on the road to high seas ABS
Before policy-specific issues can be discussed in a meaningful way, certain challenges that
are common to all proposals for high seas ABS should be addressed.
375 Ibid., pp. 331-335; Rawls, "The Law of the Peoples", 1993.
376 See COP4, Adressing the Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of Genetic Resources:
Options for Assistance to Developing Country Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD,
1998 (UNEP/CBD/COP4/22), p. 3. This link has been contested, see Simpson, "Biodiversity Prospecting:
Shopping the Wild is Not the Key to Conservation", 1997.
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4.2.1. Institutional and procedural options
No agency currently has a mandate that would allow imposing mandatory bioprospecting
regulation for ABNJ. Whereas resources under national jurisdiction may be accessed
through a contract or bilateral agreement stipulating the terms of quid pro quo, access to
biological material in ABNJ is open. In these areas, there is no party that grant access to the
high seas. Benefit-sharing obligations would have to take the form of self-imposed
obligations through flag state jurisdiction.377 Equally no recipient is immediately entitled to
these benefits. A strictly contractual or bilateral approach therefore presents inherent
weaknesses, as one of the parties, the provider, is missing.378 An initial step would be to
agree upon the aptness of a multilateral approach. Neither bilateral nor contractual ABS
solutions for the high seas appear to be proposed alternatives in on-going discussions.
Some form of institutional entity or agency would be required to be in charge of, or
associated with, a multilateral approach. The question is what sort of entity this could be.
Traditionally, the concept of ABS belongs to the realm of areas under national
jurisdiction.379 Merging this concept with the regime of the high seas requires finding an
apt institutional anchorage. This is a challenge that will have to be addressed by
stakeholders advocating a change to the status quo.
A possible institutional avenue is that of a regional approach to high seas ABS. Regional
agreements that also cover ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction are important tools for
the safeguarding the environment and biodiversity beyond the EEZ. 380 RFMOs or
frameworks like the OSPAR Convention may serve as examples. Regional agreements
present certain characteristics that should be noted here. First of all, vast parts of the high
377 This possibility will be explored below, see section 4.3.3.
378 See Matz, "Marine Biological Resources: Some Reflections on Concepts for the Protection and
Sustainable Use of Biological Resources in the Deep Sea", 2002, p. 292.
379 See CBD, article 15, which establishes the that the authority to determine access to GR rests with national
governments and is subject to their legislation, while obliging states to take measures to share benefits
arising from the commercial utilisation of these GR. See also article 4 concerning the jurisdictional scope
of the convention.
380 For an introduction to the most important regional treaties and their importance in protecting marine
ecosystems, see Warner, Protecting the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the
International Law Framework, 2009, pp. 173-205.
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seas are not covered by regional agreements. Placing ABS obligations on specific regions
may discourage bioprospecting in that area and thus not spur innovation. Also, ABS
obligations fall upon only signatory states and not third parties, which may prevent
effective implementation of ABS policies. Furthermore, the justification for ABS as a
means to fairness is less present in a regional context than a global one, as national wealth
often is more evenly distributed among parties to a regional agreement than they are at the
global level. For these reasons, regional agreements offer less potential for hosting ABS
regulation of the high seas than a global approach.
One could conceive an institutional framework connected to the sector that the invention
leads to, i.e. the end of the production line. Possibly, benefits from alimentary and
agricultural inventions deriving from high seas biological material could be dealt with
under the auspices of the FAO. A sectoral approach does present certain drawbacks. The
sector in which an invention finds its use can be arbitrary and overlapping. To have legal
obligations depend on results found only at a later stage in the bioprospecting process does
not provide bioprospectors with legal clarity. As predictability is an important factor for
investing in bioprospecting, a sectoral approach may induce disincentives to innovate.
Furthermore, these disincentives could be unevenly distributed. For instance, if an active
compound was identified and a potential application was found in a sector with benefit-
sharing obligations, it could be tempting not to invest further in developing the application
in that sector. In this scenario, it could prove better for industry to explore whether the
compound could find application in another sector that is not regulated by benefit-sharing
obligations. This argument would not be valid if either ABS is seen by the industry as
positively business-friendly, or unless all sectors were regulated. Both these scenarios
currently seem hard to realise fully. Other difficult questions would arise, such as what
should be considered a sector or whether it is rational to entrust a number of institutions
with quite similar work tasks. To sum up, a sectoral solution may prove contrary to the
objective of spurring innovation. The sectoral approach seems not to be on the table in on-
going discussions.
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Another possible institutional haven for ABS policies for biological material in the high
seas may be that of the CBD. This would involve entrusting some sort of institutional body,
existing or to be created, with a role in connection with a CBD COP decision, Nagoya
MOP decision, guidelines, or a new protocol.381 With a view to conserving biodiversity and
promoting sustainable use, this institutional option has certain advantages. Conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity in ABNJ are recognised objectives under the
Convention: contracting parties have a general obligation to cooperate “in respect of areas
beyond national jurisdiction” for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.382
Since 1992, expertise in this area has developed within the bodies of the CBD. Building
upon the ideas set forth in NP article 10, one might imagine parties to the Protocol
negotiating a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism which, either exclusively or as
a part of a larger package deal, addresses high seas genetic resources. However, any
agreement reached in this forum, will in all likelihood be without the participation of the
biggest biotech state, namely the United States.383 On the other hand, this state is neither a
party to UNCLOS nor does it seem to express any sympathy with the concept of ABNJ
benefit-sharing, 384 which decreases the relative value of this argument. Of greater
importance is the lack of institutional roots in the CBD to high seas governance that surpass
the general principle of cooperation found in article 5 and the possibilities awarded by flag
state jurisdiction through article 4. Legally, nothing stands in the way of taking the CBD as
a starting point for high seas ABS, as long as the policies are in conformity with the law of
the sea. 385 This may, however, be perceived as presenting logical, or almost
methodological, impediments. It may contradict the perception of UNCLOS as “the legal
381 See Greiber, Access and Benefit Sharing in Relation to Marine Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction, 2011, p. 34. He argues against CBD-associated organs hosting a global multilateral
benefit-sharing mechanism.
382 CBD, article 5.
383 The United States signed the CBD in 1993, but it was never ratified. UNCLOS and the Implementation
Agreement Relating to Part XI were sent to the American Senate in 1994, where ratification was rejected.
For the comparative dominance of the United States in biotechnology, see Giovannetti, et al., Beyond
Borders, 2011.
384 Chiarolla, et al., Marine Biodiversity Working Group Highlights: Tuesday, 8 May 2012, 9 May 2012.
385 CBD, article 22(2) provides that parties shall implement the convention “with respect to the marine
environment” consistently with the law of the sea.
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framework within which all activities in the ocean and seas must be carried out”.386 As
noted by Greiber, joining a CBD-based global benefit-sharing mechanism could be
interpreted as forum choice, and subsequently disconnect UNCLOS from ABS related to
marine genetic resources in ABNJ.387 This could be detrimental to the role of UNCLOS of
protecting the marine environment from all harmful human activities, and thus run counter
to the objective of conservation and sustainable use.
Applying the CBD concept of benefit-sharing to the “Constitution for the oceans” and an
UNCLOS framework could prove more fruitful. An institutional path starting from an
UNCLOS offset could ensure greater uniformity and integration with existing rights and
obligations. It could also prove beneficial to conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity if synergy effects are attained from future purely environmental regulation of
the high seas, such as MPAs.388 There is also a potential for synergies between future
UNCLOS-related regulation and the global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism
envisaged in NP article 10. As established above this mechanism has a wider scope of
application than merely the high seas, as it refers to utilisation of GR in “transboundary
situations” or where “it is not possible to obtain prior informed consent”.389 Depending on
the specific scenario, ABS for high seas biological material under UNCLOS could in fact
contribute to realising the fair distribution of benefits and the objectives of conservation
envisaged in the NP article 10 and in the CBD.
Theoretically, the issue of introducing a form of ABS regulation in an UNCLOS setting
could be done by way of amending the treaty. According to article 312, amendments other
than those relating to the activities in the Area may be proposed and a conference may be
requested. The proposition shall be forwarded to all state parties. If, after a year, at least
half of the all parties have responded favourably to a request, the Secretary-General shall
386 United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2011 (A/RES/66/77), preamble,
paragraph 4.
387 Greiber, Access and Benefit Sharing in Relation to Marine Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction, 2011, p. 34.
388 Benefits could for instance help fund MPAs or research undertaken in MPAs.
389 NP, article 10.
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convene a conference.390 The main procedural way indicated in the provision for passing an
amendment is by way of consensus. Concerning such a doubly controversial issue as both
ABNJ regulation and ABS, consensus among parties to UNCLOS seems highly unlikely.391
A hotter topic, and a procedure that does not require consensus, is that of a new
implementing agreement to UNCLOS. Several NGOs and scholars have advocated a new
implementing agreement.392 Certain parties, such as the EU, also suggest that the mandate
of the Working Group be amended in view of launching negotiations on an implementing
agreement.393 A new agreement holds great promise, such as the potential to take into
account the inadequacies of the current law of the sea and adopt holistic and modern
environmental governance of the high seas. More specifically, an implementing agreement
could assure the conservation of oceanic biodiversity and lead the way for substantial
provisions regulating their sustainable use. Concerning bioprospecting, the potential is two-
fold: firstly, it would be an opportunity to address the problems encountered by deep sea
cruises as to the legal status of biological material of the Area.394 This legal clarity could in
turn help encourage research and innovation. Secondly, a new implementing agreement
provides an opportunity to render effective the existing technology transfer obligations of
UNCLOS and thus promote fairness in the exploitation of high seas biological material. It
should be noted that an ABS regime, resembling either that of the CBD or that of the
ITPGRFA, is a potential, though far from evident, ingredient in such an implementing
agreement. Oceanic life is confronted with a variety of great and imminent threats to its
diversity. A possible scenario is that even its most ardent proponents would drop the
controversial issue of benefit-sharing in order to solve other issues, thought to be more
important. These are considerations that are closely related to the discussions on modalities
of ABS options, which will be discussed below. In the context of an UNCLOS-associated
390 UNCLOS, article 312(1).
391 See Greiber, Access and Benefit Sharing in Relation to Marine Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction, 2011, p. 47.
392 See Hart, Elements of a Possible Implementation Agreement to UNCLOS for the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 2008.
393 Chiarolla, et al., Summary of the Fifth Meeting of the Working Group on Marine Biodiversity Beyond
Areas of National Jurisdiction, 14 May 2012.
394 See above, section 2.2.4. An implementation agreement is less likely to resolve the practical difficulties of
distinguishing the biological resources of the continental shelf from those of the high seas.
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process, the structure and size of this entity would depend on how states perceive benefit-
sharing. If benefit-sharing is viewed as the exchange of scientific knowledge, thus
providing one form of fairness, a secretariat with the responsibility for administering an
Internet platform may suffice.395 The current online bioprospecting information resource
maintained by the United Nations University may serve as an example here.396 A modest
institutional option could also be a clearing-house mechanism that receives notification of
scientific research and ensures the further distribution of data. 397 If an ABS-system
resembling that outlined in NP article 10 were envisaged, a larger structure could be
required. As pointed out by Matz-Lück, full resource management, including scientific
experts, compliance control and decision-making bodies, would require a permanent
institution, and the question of legal personality would also have to be addressed.398
A candidate for the position of institutional umbrella for ABNJ ABS is already present
within the Convention. The International Seabed Authority, seated in Jamaica, is in charge
of administering the mineral resources of the Area in accordance with principles set forth in
part XI. The idea of seabed mineral resources as common heritage of mankind and the
provisions on technology transfer can be seen as founded on objectives that reflect the
“fairness” sought by ABS proponents. Additionally, the fact that the ISA is an already
existing institution is a core argument for the ISA assuming the role of managing a future
ABS regime for the high seas. It is most commonly evoked in relation to an expansion of
its mandate to include the biological resources of the Area. But it could also be associated
with bioprospecting in the water column above. As noted in a EU working paper, the ISA
may also be put in charge of managing a sui generis system, thus avoiding fragmentation of
international agencies, while benefiting from existing structures and expertise and
395 Matz-Lück, "The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind", 2010, p. 68. Her institutional proposals
concern management of the living resources in the Area.
396 United Nations University. Bioprospecting Information Resource [online database]. <www.bio
prospector.org/bioprospector/>. The database publishes known information on research and
commercialised products arising from bioprospecting in the four categories of Antarctic, Pacific, Marine
and Arctic bioprospecting.
397 Matz-Lück, "The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind", 2010, p. 69.
398 Ibid., p. 68.
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increasing the activities of an underused body.399 Politically, however, this scenario may
prove exceedingly hard to realise, given the difficulties that arose relating to the resources
of the Area when UNCLOS was adopted. As seen above, the controversy regarding the
“common heritage of mankind” still remains. Another alternative for ABS proponents is to
advocate for the creation of a separate institution that has less ideologically controversial
baggage. Whether this strategy is fair, is another question. Developing countries can argue
that history so far has cheated them of the fervently fought for benefits of the common
heritage regime, as mineral prospecting has yet to prove commercially lucrative. De la
Fayette considers that if delegates negotiating UNCLOS had known about the economic
potential of genetic resources when the Convention was negotiated, surely they would have
included them in Part XI.400 Amending or interpreting the regime of the Area to apply to
biological material on the ocean floor, seabed and the water column above could in that
regard be a fair redress of fate’s irony. Nevertheless, this scenario remains politically
difficult and can inhibit progress on the issue.
A less controversial platform for high seas ABS could also be created in the future. In
1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) convened in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. With the objective of striking a balance of environmental protection and
economic development, the conference adopted several important, yet non-binding,
documents, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the action
program Agenda 21.401 Following the Conference, the UN General-Assembly established
the Commission on Sustainable Development, whose task includes the monitoring of
environmental and development goals in the UN system and overseeing the implementation
of Agenda 21.402 Marking the twentieth anniversary of the conference, states will meet
again in June 2012 in Rio for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development,
399 Council of the European Union, Reflections on the Management of Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction (Background paper 12), European Union, 2006 (11510/06 ADD 12), p. 9. See also
Matz-Lück, "The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind", 2010, pp. 72-73, who favours this
option for biological resources in the Area, but recognises its unlikelihood.
400 De la Fayette, "Institutional Arrangements for the Legal Regime Governing Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction – Commentary on Tullio Scovazzi", 2010, p. 77.
401 See Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2003, pp. 52-69. Equally, both the CBD and
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change were opened for signature at UNCED.
402 See Kiss and Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law, 2007, p. 50.
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the so-called Rio+20 Conference. Oceans are one of seven key topics that have been
highlighted in the preparations to the conference.403 Also during the preparations for the
conference, over half of the states attending an intercessional meeting held in December
2011 had addressed the oceans in their submissions, thus indicating that parties wish for
oceanic issues to figure prominently at the Conference.404 At the same time, deeming the
current institutional situation for environmental law inadequate, several states are now
calling for the establishment of a World Environment Organisation. Inter alia, this was one
of the high-level political messages to Rio+20 from the Governing Council of United
Nations Environment Program.405 Similar calls are heard from environmental lawyers and
NGOs.406 Less ambitious institutional reforms are certainly also on the table.407 Irrespective
of whether institutional issues are substantially treated among the many issues to be
discussed at Rio +20, these proposals show that institutions preoccupied with oceanic
governance may also be created outside CBD and UNCLOS. Concerning this currently
completely hypothetical situation, not many remarks can be made on the potential of such
institutions to spur innovation or to provide fairness. A link to sustainable use and
conservation, however, seems a likely outcome if ABS for the high seas were connected to
such institutional approaches in the future.
Finding the appropriate forum is a task that cannot be circumvented. Whether the entity
builds upon the CBD, UNCLOS or other instruments, the characteristics of such an entity
would depend on the rights and obligations proposed. And herein lies a still greater
challenge: determining the possible modalities of ABS regulation for the high seas. Now,
one such material issue, common to all ABS proposals for the high seas, will be discussed.
403 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio 2012 Issues Brief no. 4: Oceans, UNCSD
Secretariat, 2012.
404 Powers, "Crafting a Consise Outcome", 2012, p. 9.
405 Governing Coucil of the United Nations Environment Programme, Proceedings of the Governing Council,
26th session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, 24 February 2011
(UNEP/GC.26/19), p. 75. Some delegations preferred establishing a World Environmental Organization,
others favoured changing UNEP’s mandate, while yet others preferred a combination of these two options.
406 See e.g. Centre International de Droit Comparé de l'Environnement, Appel des Juristes et des Associations
de Droit de l'Environnement, 28 October 2011, pp. 71-73.
407 Covino-Kerpelman, "Regional Preparations for Rio+20", 2012, p. 14. She cites propositions such as the
creation of a Sustainable Development Council to subsume the Commission or the establishment of
ombudspersons for future generations.
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4.2.2. Triggers for benefit-sharing
If an ABS system is to be envisaged, the benefit-sharing has to start at some point. An
invitation or an obligation to share benefits will have to be triggered at a certain stage of the
prospecting or at subsequent stages. This entails a search for apt actions or moments in
time that trigger an invitation or obligation to share. For the case of voluntary benefit-
sharing, i.e. an invitation to share benefits, identifying triggers is useful, but less pressing
than for mandatory solutions. In this discussion, emphasis is therefore put on the triggers
for a mandatory policy option.
Identifying triggers will likely require a choice to be made with respect to the question of
distinguishing pure and applied research, either by choosing triggers that only come into
play for applied sciences and leave the pure sciences alone, or by opting for triggers that do
not differentiate fundamental from applied sciences, thus avoiding the problematic
distinction.
When searching for a trigger, one possibility is opting for initial moments, such as when a
research entity has established that it wishes to conduct a cruise. The question is what the
implications would be if this early moment is chosen for triggering obligations. At this
moment, the composition and intentions of bioprospectors vary. Some start out as purely
academic, taxonomical missions, and their discoveries are only later used for commercial
purposes, or the material is transferred to ex situ collections and later developed by other
persons. If the aim is to make obligations fall only on commercially oriented
bioprospecting, obligations are likely to only to be applicable where a commercial intent is
already present and where this intent is divulged. If obligations are unevenly distributed
among the same group of persons, there is a risk that the result would be unfair and create
unbalanced incentives. Compared to cruises where the commercial application is
discovered years later, obligations would be unevenly distributed. Commercial funding of
new cruises could then be less lucrative than further research on existing collections, thus
providing a disincentive to innovation. If the aim is to make no distinction of pure and
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applied sciences, it should be noted that no benefits have been created at this moment.
Especially if the obligation takes the form of monetary benefits, this trigger would in reality
not result in benefit-sharing, but merely be a tax placed upon an intention to research. The
only real alternative under which this moment can be considered as a trigger is for
obligations to let scientists from disadvantaged states participate in the research. This
scenario resembles the legal right of coastal states to participate in MSR undertaken by
other parties in the EEZ and the continental shelf.408 This trigger may not necessarily
discourage innovation, but modality questions of who should be able to participate would
have to be addressed.
Another option is to make these initial moments trigger suspended obligations applicable to
all, rather than substantive obligations. Initial action could trigger a duty to notify the
institutional entity of a planned cruise. The system established for MSR in the EEZ or on
the continental shelf of a foreign state can serve as a model here. According to UNCLOS
article 248, states that intend to undertake MSR in these areas shall, “not less than six
months in advance” of the start of the project, give information to the coastal state on the
nature of the project, the methods employed, and the geographical area where research will
be undertaken. A system of implied consent on certain conditions is established, and
permission is the norm rather than the exception. 409 A similar notification to the
institutional entity could be constructed for the MSR in the high seas. Some modifications
would be required, such as the time frame for prior notification. The absence of interests of
coastal state sovereignty in the high seas would perhaps not warrant as much as six months
prior notice. Nor does there seem to be any reason for the entity to deny access, given the
principle of MSR as a high seas freedom. If combined with a duty to divulge scientific
methods employed or environmental impact assessments, it may be beneficial to the
conservation of biodiversity and to ensure the sustainable scientific use of marine
resources. The provisions of CCAMLR could be a basis for ensuring a sound interplay of
408 UNCLOS, article 241(1)(a).
409 Ibid., article 252. For an empirical study of denials and clearances for MSR in different states, see Gorina-
Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific Research, 2003, pp. 184-190.
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resource exploitation and conservation.410 A notification system would also provide insight
as to the number and nature of current research projects, information that is currently
fragmented.411 Such information could also provide a basis for sound decision-making,
which presumably would be beneficial to the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity. A notification system has the potential not to discourage innovation if
notification is a simple and cost-efficient procedure, perhaps in the form of a standard
formulary. Notification in itself would not require establishing a specific commercial or
non-commercial intent. As such, innovation through research remains a high seas freedom,
but would be subject to a procedural requirement. Besides providing information and
promoting sustainable use, notification could allow for further subsequent benefit-sharing,
pending a possible commercial application. Interesting as the idea of suspended obligations
is, a new trigger would have to be found for prompting substantial benefit-sharing
obligations.
A possibility is to opt for the very first step of actual bioprospecting, the action of
sampling. This would correspond with how access is usually seen as the action triggering
benefit-sharing under the CBD article 15.412 This action as a trigger is confronted with the
same drawbacks as substantial benefit-sharing starting at moments prior to the cruise. As
benefits have yet to be created, it would be a disincentive to innovation if unfruitful cruises
end up not only having to cover the cost of the cruise, but also some sort of transaction or
obligation to another party. There are of course less extreme scenarios where exceptions
may be created for cruises later proving unsuccessful. Yet the difficult criterion of intent is
equally problematic at this moment in time, and is, as indicated above, likely not to provide
a regulation that applies to researchers in fair, equal and predictable manner. For these
reasons, the moment of sampling presents with important drawbacks as a trigger for
obligations. On the other hand, if no distinction of pure from applied research is made, and
410 See above, section 3.4.1.
411 For an overview of some of the larger, known projects, see Arico and Salpin, Bioprospecting of Genetic
Resources in the Deep Seabed, 2005, pp.16-19.
412 See Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable Sharing
Commitment in the CBD, 2007, pp. 58-62. The authors argue that benefit-sharing trigger under the CBD
could more usefully be seen as the moment of “utilization” of GR rather than the moment of access.
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obligations fall on both pure and applied sciences from the sampling moment, it could
represent a step away from article 87 of UNCLOS and the MSR regime. The magnitude of
the change required and the compatibility of new regulations with the existing framework
would depend on what obligation actually is placed upon the bioprospectors.
A later moment that can be considered for triggering substantive ABS obligations is when
the biological material is utilised. Synthesising DNA from biological material or making
new modified organisms can be examples of such utilisation.413 Young and Tvedt note that
this trigger is externally verifiable, and they suggest several approaches to how it can be
further determined. 414 Retained here is that utilisation can be categorised by stage of
development from collection to product development.415 As stated above, the action of
collecting presents drawbacks as a trigger. The exact demarcation for later actions would
thus have to be determined. If the intention is for high seas ABS is to leave pure MSR
untouched, such actions could be associated with commercial use.
For instance, triggering actions could be the granting of a patent. This action would both
provide a clear point of demarcation for commercialisation, even though historically non-
commercial actors, such as universities, are increasingly seeking patent protection.416 This
moment indicates that new knowledge has been found, and that non-monetary benefits
have been created at this point. This makes this action a possible candidate for triggering
non-monetary benefits. Whether this trigger otherwise spurs innovation, promotes
conservation and sustainable use, or is a fair option depends on the form of benefit-sharing
chosen.
Concerning monetary benefits, a granted patent does not indicate that any economic benefit
has been gained, as the entry into market of an invention may lie many years ahead.417 If
413 Ibid., p. 59.
414 Ibid., pp. 66-68.
415 Ibid., p. 67.
416 See above, section 2.1.2.3.
417 Salpin and Germani, "Patenting of Research Results Related to Genetic Resources from Areas beyond
National Jurisdiction", 2007, p. 16.
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obligations were triggered before revenue is gained, bioprospectors and industry would
have to factor in yet another cost to the already risky investment. This can be seen as taxing
risk taking. The effect this may have on the willingness to explore and innovate is hard to
assess, but it can be assumed that some view such a trigger as a disincentive to innovation.
A related option may prove more apt to spur innovation: the filing of a patent application or
the granting of a patent could trigger a suspended obligation, and a signal to the relevant
institutional entity that benefit-sharing obligations may occur at a later stage. As suspended
obligations go, this option offers fewer possibilities of a synergy effect on conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity than the notification option discussed above.
A later triggering moment could for instance be when the revenues from a commercial
application exceed a particular sum or when the application has been on the market for a
particular period of time. This would require patience in relation to some of the inventions.
In terms of incentives, it can be assumed that as time passes after the moment of access, the
sense of entitlement to the product grows and sharing the benefits will seem less and less
natural in the eyes of the holder. The situation is somewhat similar to that of the ITPGRFA
seen above. Several years may pass from the sampling until a product is launched. This is
of particular relevance for the pharmaceutical industry where extensive trials are required.
Uncertain but recurring indications estimate that it may take up to 15 years to develop a
product in this sector.418 The advantage of setting a particular gross net sum as a trigger is
particularly relevant with regards to the fair treatment of unsuccessful or semi-successful
bioprospecting enterprises: an obligation does not occur unless benefits truly have arisen. If
not, there seems to be little reason to adhere to a redistributive objective. On the other hand,
it can be argued this it is a form of burden placed upon success, which would discourage
the considerable investments needed for this particular form of innovation. This can be
amended to a certain extent by opting for forms of benefits other than monetary benefits,
such as the sharing of knowledge or information on samples.
418 See e.g. Smagadi, Medicinal Bioprospecting: Policy Options for Access and Benefit-Sharing, 2009, p. 39.
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4.3. Possible modalities of an ABS regime for bioprospecting
In the following, a few of the multitude of possible modalities of an ABS regime are
examined. They will be explored in an order tentatively moving from what may be
characterized as the most comprehensive approaches to the less comprehensive and softer
approaches.
4.3.1. A global multilateral benefit-sharing fund
One option is to view benefit-sharing as monetary. If a mechanism is multilateral, this
could take the form of a fund that serves as focal point and administers the monetary
transactions. Monetary sharing could comprise both payments and legal positions that can
be of financial value to its holder, such as co-ownership of IPR or licensing rights.419
First, for the case of a scenario where money is transferred to a fund, one question is
whether contributions from bioprospectors or subsequent product developers should be
mandatory or voluntary. If voluntary, contributions to the fund would depend on the
inclinations of bioprospectors, industry and other possible contributors. A voluntary system
has the advantage of not creating disincentives to innovate. On the other hand, there is a
risk that it would simply not be used, and that there would be only limited or symbolic
funds available for the promotion of innovation, conservation and sustainable use. Clearly,
an empty fund would no impact in achieving fairness. For a voluntary fund model to be
functional, there would have to be incentives for parties to contribute.
If mandatory, benefits would have to come into such a fund depending on the triggers for
benefit-sharing as discussed above. Because monetary benefits are usually associated with
commercial research and not basic research, knowing when fund contribution is warranted
should be associated with commercialisation, as utilisation as a trigger provides no
indication of monetary benefits having been created. In order to promote innovation, legal
predictability identifying relevant persons and circumstances should be established. This
419 See NP, Annex 1(1).
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means that an end point must also be set for obligations.420 An important and difficult
question that arises is how far away from the original sampled material the benefit-creating
process can go before participation in a fund model is no longer necessary.421 The answer is
somewhere between two extremes of any use of knowledge that has been acquired at any
point as a result of the material, and the direct use of a sampled organism. Effective
implementation of any such attempt to set a limit could involve relying on the patent
system. This would likely require resolving of the controversial issue of disclosure of
origin in patent applications.422 Resolving this issue in a manner perceived as not providing
a disincentive to innovation may be an important practical barrier to a functioning global
multilateral fund. In order to avoid conflict with the rights awarded by a patent, the
monetary contributions must be made independently of the patent itself. Concerning the
size of contributions obligations should remain relatively modest in order to avoid strain on
innovation. On the other hand, for benefit recipients to be able to perform conservation
initiatives or create innovation, the obligations should not be too small.
If one assumes, as above, that possible obligations fall upon patentees with commercially
successful invention and only these, mandatory obligations would have to be supervised to
ensure compliance. Presumably, there would be a need to keep track of the success and
gains for each patented product or general portfolios of high seas biological material, in
order to distribute benefits. There is a risk that this will be perceived as creating
bureaucratic strain on innovation.
If cost-efficient reporting solutions are found, a next question is who shall be at the
receiving end for monetary benefits. This question arises both for a mandatory and
voluntary fund model. There are many possible worthy beneficiaries that could be
envisaged for the conservation of biodiversity. Given the lack of investments in high seas
420 Drankier, et al., "Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction", 2012, p. 385, drawing
this less; Young and Tvedt, Balancing Building Blocks of a Functional ABS System, 2009, pp. 23-24.
421 This thought draws inspiration from Young and Tvedt, Balancing Building Blocks of a Functional ABS
System, 2009, p. 24.
422 See generally Hoare and Tarasofsky, "Asking and Telling: Can “Disclosure of Origin” Requirements in
Patent Applications Make a Difference?", 2007; Tvedt, "Elements for Legislation in User Countries to
Meet the Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing Commitment", 2006, p. 204.
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conservation and protection of marine environment over decades, recipients dedicated to
the oceanic realm are likely candidates. Theoretically, however, one may even imagine that
a high seas ABS system could contribute to mainland conservation of biodiversity and even
counter the practical shortcomings of benefit-sharing in the CBD.
For emphasis on conservation of the marine environment, a fund may transfer benefits to
states, regional entities, international organisations or NGOs who propose specific
conservation projects, such as the establishment of MPAs. Funding could be awarded to
research institutions for hard science projects on issues relating to loss of oceanic
biodiversity, ocean acidification or bio-remediation, such as the capacity of the oceans to
store CO2 or other projects that that may help researchers understand the many mysteries
that still exist regarding microorganisms in seas. There are several examples of promising
research that may prove important in order to tackle climate change, for instance by using
oceanic biological material for the production of bio-fuel.423 Reducing carbon emissions
and subsequently ocean acidification would preserve a larger segment of biodiversity in the
oceans. In such a scenario, benefit-sharing from bioprospecting would constitute a payment
for the ecosystem services provided by the oceans to the whole of humanity. In short,
distribution of monetary benefits could be used to preserve biodiversity, encourage
sustainable use, and be a fair option. It could also represent an incentive to conduct certain
types of research rather than others. Yet, this would be a form of subsidising, which may go
counter to the general objective of spurring innovation. The relevance of the subsidy
argument depends on the faith accorded to free market mechanisms to also advance
research in fields where economic gain may be uncertain. One might also interject that it
would be fairer and more sustainable to establish subsidising obligations on less
conservation-friendly resource exploitation, such as fossil fuels, rather than on low-impact
resource exploitation that may lead to advances in fields such as pharmacology or food
production.
423 See generally Alper and Stephanopoulos, "Engineering for Biofoels: Exploiting Innate Microbial Capacity
or Importing Biosynthetic Potential?", 2009.
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A related option that emphasises fairness would be to consider monetary benefits as co-
ownership to IPR. For instance, given increasing tendency of western universities and
public research centres to seek patent protection of their research results, a possibility is to
target these users of biodiversity for particular benefit-sharing measures. Compulsory co-
ownership of IPR would not be compatible with the fundamental exclusivity of the rights
awarded to the patentee by a patent.424 For this reason, a mandatory model is not an option.
On the other hand, the fund could invite universities to share ownership of these patents
with colleagues in disadvantaged states.425 Depending on how general or limited the scope
of recipients is made, this option could provide a way of rendering efficient the UNCLOS
provisions on technology transfer of Part XIV. This could provide for innovation being
spurred with the participation of a greater part of the scientific community. The drawback
is that, if perceived as a burden placed upon universities, there is a risk that the universities
may become less attractive as partners for cooperation with industry. This would in turn be
contrary to the overall objective of increased innovation.
To sum up, there is no doubt that there are many possible recipients of means from a fund
model that could promote the four criteria set forth here. It is hard, however, to get around
the counter-argument that monetary benefit-sharing can provide disincentives to
innovation. This is especially the case for mandatory solutions. These options are also
confronted with important challenges of designating whom obligations shall fall upon, and
in which circumstances.
4.3.2. Sharing non-monetary benefits: common pool for biological material
Non-monetary benefits may include, among other forms, sharing of research results,
cooperation in scientific research and admittance to ex situ facilities or databases.426 One
option that takes these alternatives into account is the establishment of a common pool for
biological material retrieved from the high seas and possibly from the Area and other parts
424 See above, section 2.1.2.2.
425 This option could also be realised without the intermediary of a fund, see below, section 4.3.3.
426 NP, Annex, article 1(2).
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of the sea.427 This idea is related to the idea of an open source approach, developed in the
world of computer programming and software world.428
Biological resources in situ in the high seas are common pool resources. After collection
and appropriation, biological material may be held in private collections429 or deposited in
an exclusive manner such as under the Budapest Treaty. If a common pool is established
for material retrieved by bioprospecting, the main difference from such known approaches
is in the conditions of access for third parties. The general idea is that benefits retrieved
from the high seas would be deposited in a public trust entity and made available to others
in a non-exclusive or partially exclusive manner. Hence, third party access would constitute
the benefit-sharing. Benefits would then take the form of the sharing of knowledge and
information with to those who seek such knowledge. This solution would constitute a
benefit-sharing mechanism based on the needs of the scientific community and others.430 It
also offers a way of meeting the requirements of UNCLOS article 244 on publication and
dissemination of research results despite a patent being granted, e.g. on a microorganism.
This form of sharing would provide researchers with the ability to access deposited
material or information and further study these. In turn, this would further scientific
knowledge, which would be beneficial to innovation, at least as regards basic scientific
research. It would provide equal opportunity of all to access to the material, even though
only a few have the means to collect it. This makes it an option that promotes fairness. A
common pool idea holds no inherent North-South fairness, but the added value of such
access would presumably be greater for scientists from states with less developed structures
427 Greiber, Access and Benefit Sharing in Relation to Marine Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction, 2011, pp. 36 and 46-47; Tvedt, Common Pool in Aquaculture – Sui Generis and Other
Options for Benefit Sharing, 2011.
428 On the development of the open source movement, see e.g. Mandrusiak, "Balancing Open Source
Paradigms and Traditional Intellectual Property Models to Optimize Innovation", 2010, pp. 313-316.
429 For instance the pharmaceutical company Pharmamar has a library of one hundred thousand marine
organisms, that the company and potential partners can enjoy, see Pharmamar, Partnering, 2012,
<www.pharmamar.com/partnering.aspx>.
430 Greiber, Access and Benefit Sharing in Relation to Marine Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction, 2011, p. 36.
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of inter-institutional cooperation. Also, such a common pool could be associated with
capacity building initiatives.
Concerning the input into such a common pool, there are two main possibilities. The first is
the deposit of raw material, e.g. samples of microorganisms. This is a method known from
private collections or the Budapest Treaty. This option can help conserve biodiversity ex-
situ.431 For material deposits to reach the intended objective of fairness, a decentralised
deposit system may be more efficient than a centralised option. Here, the functioning of
CGIAR centres may serve as an example.432 Whether this is feasible would have to be
considered having regard to cost-efficiency.
The second option is that a common pool is composed of processed data relating to the
biological material, but not samples of the material. In particular, the pool may consist of
sequencing data of sampled species. This option is also grounded on known methods and
procedures. The GenBank sequence database could serve as an example of an open access
database containing vast amounts sequencing data of organisms available to researchers.433
Available sequencing data as a form of benefit-sharing may disseminate knowledge fairly
and irrespectively of where the recipients are located. The advantages in terms of
conserving biodiversity are more indirect than the case indicated above for deposit of
material.
A question that would have to be addressed for both sample deposits and sequencing
deposit solutions is whether it should be a mandatory or voluntary option. The dilemma of
voluntary versus mandatory is the same as for the fund option: a voluntary solution would
not put more strain on industry and researching entities than they see fit, yet a voluntary
mechanism risks not being used.
431 Potentially, but controversially, it could be used as a means reintroduce endangered species into the wild.
Given the vastness of the ocean, how useful such reintroduction is would have to be evaluated along with
the considerations of ecological impacts of reintroduction in general.
432 See above, section 3.3.1; Brahy and Louafi, The Role of the Research Sector in ABS Governance, 2007,
pp. 9-12.
433 See National Center for Biotechnology Information. GenBank [online database], 2011.
<www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/>.
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Yet, a voluntary mechanism offers advantages of flexibility. A voluntary mechanism may
more easily allow for collaborations with existing private collections or sequencing
databases than the mandatory option: If these holders of resources consider cooperation
beneficial, synergies may take the form of allowing access to material that would otherwise
not be available. It would take the form of a voluntary retro-activity of an ABS policy.434
Voluntary solutions can open up for deposit of biological material from entities other than
researching vessels and bioprospectors, who also may acquire biological material during
the course of high seas activities, such as mining operators or offshore drilling companies.
Activities that have potentially damaging environmental repercussions 435 could then
contribute to preserving some of the biodiversity they put at risk. The geographical scope
of a voluntary common pool may also be extended to bioprospecting or other activities
undertaken in other zones, such as in the EEZ, continental shelf or the territorial sea. Open
access to such material, which would otherwise remained closed, could be beneficial to
promoting fairness and innovation.
If mandatory, obligations to contribute could be prompted by the suspended obligation of
prior notification, and substantive obligations triggered for instance by the “utilisation”
which would have to be given a specific definition. If funding for bioprospecting is to be
secured, the relationship to IPR has to be taken into account. Because an invention must be
novel and involve an inventive step in order to meet the requirements for patentability,436
information that discloses the invention can in most cases not be made public knowledge
before the application is filed. If the material or sequencing data in itself reveals an
invention, deposit within the common pool would either have to be put on hold until the
application is filed, or be kept confidential by the institutional entity until the patent
434 A retroactive mandatory regulation seems unlikely, as it may not only be politically difficult, but also run
counter to contractual obligations regarding the material.
435 On the environmental impacts of seabed mining and fossil fuel extraction compared to bioprospecting,
Ramirez-Llodra, et al., "Man and the Last Great Wildernes", 2011, pp. 11-15.
436 TRIPS Agreement, article 27(1). There are different understandings of the “novelty” requirement, ranging
from an absolute novelty requirement to a local novelty requirement, see Grubb, Patents for Chemicals,
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, 1999, pp. 54-58.
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application is filed. This may depend on how sequencing is divulged or how available the
material is in a common pool. If no leniency is given, a bioprospector who is unsure of
whether the material will later be used for patented inventions, and deposits material or
data, risks being beaten to the patenting by others accessing the common pool. It would
thus discourage innovation if the persons sampling the primary material are not awarded a
reasonable timeframe for mandatory deposit or confidentiality.
Building upon these considerations, a few general remarks can be made relating to what
kind of material or data the common pool would contain: it can contain material that the
sampler has the intention to commercialise. For this case, further innovation can consist of
almost unlimited pure and applied research. The common pool can also contain data or
material that has contributed in a more or less direct manner to a patented invention. Once
deposited and made public, the patent protection enjoyed by the patentee and depositor is
the same as it would have been without the deposit: the patentee has the exclusive right to
prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these
purposes the patented product or process. 437 It would be beneficial to avoid claim
infringements and provide clarity, if information on the extent of the patent were available
with the sample or data. The limits of further research on the material would then depend
on an interpretation of the patent claim. As seen above, research undertaken to understand
the sampled material would be permitted.438 Other rights and obligations may follow from
the extent of the research exemption under domestic law. For the case of a global
mechanism, harmonisation of applicable rules for this setting would provide increased legal
clarity, and thus be a contributing factor to an efficient regime promoting innovation. This
objective can be pursued for instance through standard formularies for both deposit of
material/data and for access to the common pool.
In this scenario indicated just above, no obligation apart from respecting patents is
indicated to fall upon those who use material or data in the common pool. In order to
encourage deposits, a scenario where conditions of use fall upon the secondary user can
437 TRIPS Agreement, article 28.
438 See above, section 2.1.3.2.
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also be envisaged. Both for the case of voluntary and mandatory deposit, use of common
pool material that leads to commercial gain may be attributable back to the persons having
made the original deposit. This approach contrasts that under the ITPGRFA, where benefits
from commercialisation go back to the mechanism. The proposed option would to a lesser
degree impede furthering scientific knowledge and research. Placing such obligations
would raise the recurring question of how far away from the material or data accessed in
the common pool, the new invention must be. This almost meta-variant of ABS could,
however, provide a way to ensure that the initial risk-taking is rewarded and problems of
so-called free-riders may be limited.
When a researching entity has to disclose the results of its research, there is a risk that this
party will seek the broadest patent protection possible for their invention. The common
pool idea may increase the already existing challenge of defensive patenting, i.e. patents
that do not cover what the patentee does or needs, but blocks innovation from
competitors. 439 Ironically, a common pool solution may in this respect contribute to
blocking subsequent research. This is a challenge that must be resolved within the patent
system and not within the regulation attached to a common pool. In a scenario where
parties accessing the common pool can also use these resources for commercial
development, there is, at least theoretically, a risk of what can be called doubly defensive
patenting. This problem would have to be addressed by the terms of access to the common
pool resources.
Compared to the monetary transfer scenario discussed above, this option presents important
advantages for the promotion of scientific innovation. It is also a way to render operable
the technology transfer provisions of UNCLOS, and thus meet the objectives sought out by
the negotiators of the “Constitution for the oceans”. If associated with a notification system
before venturing onto the high seas, no distinction need be made in any legal document of
pure and applied sciences. Rendering what is initially in situ common pool resources de
facto common pool resources, irrespective of economic capacities, may provide fairness
439 Grubb, Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, 1999, p. 434.
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and spur innovation. In the larger perspective, a common pool could help justify why
patents are, or should be, available for living organisms.
4.3.3. Bioprospecting under flag state jurisdiction
Ships are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state under whose flag it sails.440 Thus,
when the minimum requirements of the law of the sea are met, states are free to regulate
the conditions of access to biological material for their nationals. A conceivable option is
that of requiring permits for bioprospecting could be associated with obligations share
benefits. For parties to the CBD and the NP, the access and benefit-sharing regimes that
currently are under development for areas under national jurisdiction could be extended by
domestic legislation to their nationals venturing onto the high seas. Even for non-parties to
the CBD, there are no legal barriers to implementing such requirements on high seas ABS,
though this is less likely.
From a state perspective, there are important political disincentives to enacting such
domestic regulation. For monetary benefit-sharing, the same redistributive objectives can
be reached through ordinary domestic tax law. For monetary and all other forms of
benefits, states have little, if any, incentive to place economic or practical burdens on their
nationals when other states do not. It is not within the interest of states to place national
research institutions or industry in a position of competitive disadvantage in the
international market. Furthermore, were states to enact such regulations, this could create a
problem of flag state shopping, at least for the private institutions conducting
bioprospecting: private institutions would have an incentive to relocate to states without
such measures and sail under the flag of that state.441 For public research institutions co-
operating with private entities, relocating is a less practically accessible option, as they are
less mobile than private entities. But the main disincentive remains also for this group; if
conditions are applied to their bioprospecting, they might make a less desirable partner for
440 UNCLOS, article 92(1).
441 Pursuant to UNCLOS, article 91, there must nonetheless be a “genuine link between the State and the
ship”.
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joint venture bioprospecting with the industry than research institutions without such
competitive disadvantages. There is a risk that regulations may be perceived as contrary to
innovation for that state. The challenge to such an approach is even greater if no other, or
only a few other states, were to enact such legislation: the burden of a Good Samaritan is
even heavier to carry alone. No such domestic legislation is known to have been enacted.442
4.4. Closing remarks on regulatory options
This discussion shows some of the variety in options that can be considered for high seas
benefit-sharing.
It can be remarked that conceiving solutions that specifically target applied research and
leave the pure sciences untouched is challenging also in the context of proposing options,
both in terms of finding an apt trigger for benefit-sharing and for outlining such options.
Avoiding the distinction of pure and applies research leaves greater flexibility in terms of
spurring innovation. Yet, given the principles set forth for (at least pure) marine scientific
research in UNCLOS, not making a distinction reduces the margin of appreciation of what
can be established for mandatory benefit-sharing.
Most of these solutions are confronted with the challenge of how to spur innovation. Yet,
some of the options discussed present more substantial drawbacks than others. Mandatory
sharing of monetary benefits is particularly hard to construe in a manner that does not
conflict with patent law and which spurs innovation.
Building upon the objectives of UNCLOS to make research available is less threatening to
the safeguarding of innovation. Perhaps it can even be considered that those providing the
biological material can be the recipients of monetary benefits as a quid pro quo for having
shared benefits in the first place. This is an option that can be conceived under a common
442 See e.g. Leary, "International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea", 2009, p. 363.
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pool idea. Yet, the common pool regulatory option can present drawbacks in terms of a
limitation of the exclusivity otherwise offered to bioprospectors. Ironically, though, the
most important challenges to innovation than can arise under this model are due to patent
law, which has as its primary justification the protection of investments and the promotion
of innovation.
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5. Conclusions
The claim made in 1982 was that UNCLOS is “a comprehensive constitution for the oceans
which will stand the test of time”.443 The president of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea was partially right, for just as a national constitution, not all
questions are answered therein. The legal questions raised by the activity of bioprospecting
in the high seas illustrate that while there is little doubt on the applicability of fundamental
high seas principles to bioprospecting, uncertainty arises when more concrete provisions
are attempted adapted to other uses of the high seas than those originally conceived.
De lege lata, bioprospecting in the high seas is indubitably permitted under international
law. By adopting a resource perspective it has been shown that the biological resources of
the high seas can be appropriated and also be subject to exclusive intellectual property
rights. By adopting an activity perspective, it has been pointed out that the legal grounding
for the lawfulness of bioprospecting is a complex question. It is a question that can be
answered with opinions, rather than definitive truths. Yet the alternative legal grounds
determine what further conditions the activity is subjected to. For a predominately
commercial activity, these legal grounds coincide or overlap to various degrees with the
rights and obligations under patent law. The overlap is particularly present if
bioprospecting is considered regulated by the framework for marine scientific research.
Here, the views held by states and commentators on the current legal framework applicable
melt with de lege ferenda arguments.
It may be that bioprospectors can live comfortably with this uncertainty, as duties under the
law of the sea are chiefly placed upon states and not researching entities, while patent law
can provide persons with more concrete rights and duties. From a state perspective, the lack
of certain answers as to the exact law applicable to bioprospecting can cede ground for the
443 United Nations General Assembly, A Constitution for the Oceans, 1982.
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development of customary law. Yet the situation also leaves room for creativity for
proponents of benefit-sharing for the high seas. An option is to consider bioprospecting as
MSR, a freedom of the high seas currently associated with benefit-sharing elements. In this
sense, it could be strategic for proponents of high seas ABS to argue that UNCLOS makes
no distinction of pure and applied sciences, and that bioprospecting should be fully
subjected to the MSR regime, and consider the various forms under which these elements
may be adapted to the new uses of oceanic resources.
The examination of options for ABS in existing instruments provides lessons. But these are
chiefly lessons on what has not worked optimally until now. This thesis shows that none of
these measures can be transposed without substantial changes to a high seas setting, which
underscores the need for creative solutions if benefit-sharing for the high seas is to evolve.
The task of the proponents is not an easy one: they are confronted with the fact that they
have fewer cards to play in negotiations than in a CBD setting. In contrast to the situation
under CBD, access to the resources is open and the quid pro quo argument has less direct
applicability. As bioprospecting in most cases also is an environmentally sound activity,
the main rationale for arguing that new ABNJ instruments should comprise benefit-sharing,
is a quite abstract form of fairness. Perhaps ABS could also find its justification in a search
for more uniform concepts underlying resource exploitation in both areas within and
beyond national jurisdiction. This is equally an abstract reason for advocating change.
Credible solutions would then have to have to be constructed with due regard to the
interests of those who currently create the benefits.
There probably is no option to high seas ABS without drawbacks. Whether these
drawbacks can be justified by the objective of sharing benefits is, in the end, a political
question. Providing and further developing these concrete regulatory alternatives may help
determine whether there is political room for ABS for bioprospecting in the high seas.
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